



The Mexican Revolution

In 1876, Mexico entered a long period of political stability with the advent of the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Díaz, a former general, ruled the country until he stepped down in 1911 in the face of a massive revolt. He presided over an economic transformation that saw the influx of foreign capital, especially in the form of railroads (which expanded from less than four hundred miles of track to fifteen thousand) and mining enterprises. Textile manufacturing and export crops such as sugar and cotton boomed. Politically, Díaz centralized power, effectively ending partisan warfare and the frequent regime change that had plagued Mexico since its independence. On the other hand, dispossession and rising inequality were a fundamental part of Porfirian Mexico. Violence, fraud, and debt stripped millions of peasants of their land; by 1910, nearly two-thirds of the population were landless peasant families. Wages remained flat as the prices of staple foods spiraled upward. And the regime provided no real outlet for discontent over such conditions: It banned opposition political parties and used force to crush strikes and other protests.

In 1908, the wealthy Coahuilan Francisco Madero began a daring presidential campaign against Porfirio Díaz, who was planning his eighth reelection. Madero, the scion of one of northern Mexico's wealthiest and most influential families, called for free elections, an independent judiciary, and an uncensored press. Hampered by fraud and violence, his forces failed to win a single congressional seat in the 1910 elections, and Madero fled to San Antonio, Texas, where he declared himself provisional president of Mexico and called for the armed overthrow of Díaz. A series of revolts—mostly unplanned by Madero—erupted by the spring of 1911. Madero's supporters captured Ciudad Juárez, opposite El Paso, Texas, in March. Díaz resigned in May. Another presidential election was held, and Madero won decisively.

Building a new order that could rule Mexico and meet the enormous and conflicting expectations of its people proved much more difficult than toppling the Díaz regime. Madero devoted most of his energies to formal legal and political reform, generally rejecting calls for land redistribution. The key constituents of the old regime—regional political bosses, wealthy hacienda owners and industrialists, and the federal army—never accepted his rule, believing him perilously weak and unable to prevent the lower orders from tearing

society apart. On the other hand, those like Morelos peasant leader Emiliano Zapata, hoping for a sweeping reform of landholding, were angered by Madero's unwillingness to heed their calls. In 1913, the commander of the federal army assassinated Madero and dismissed the congress. His forces desperately fought to undo the revolution. Venustiano Carranza, a Coahuilan, sought to restore Madero's liberal and moderate rule, whereas others, like Pancho Villa in the North and Emiliano Zapata in the South, fought for a more radical vision of land reform. A plethora of local rebellions and alliances, many unconnected to larger factions or ideologies, also emerged by the end of 1913. Civil war—at first between the revolutionaries and the federal army, and then among the different revolutionary factions—would wrack Mexico for the rest of the decade. By the early 1920s, a central government under the leadership of one of Carranza's former generals had asserted control over most of the nation. The post-revolutionary regime enjoyed much broader support than Porfirio Díaz had, and, in the next few decades, it would launch programs of mass education, infrastructure construction, economic development, and land redistribution that would substantially improve the lives of most Mexican citizens.

This chapter explores the enormous impacts of the Revolution on Mexican Americans, U.S. border policy, and diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States. Nearly one in ten Mexican citizens fled to the United States over the course of the decade, dramatically transforming the culture and demography of the borderlands. The Mexican-descent population of the United States tripled between 1910 and 1920, most visibly in places like Los Angeles that had until that time become overwhelmingly Anglo-American. At the same time, relations between the Mexican and U.S. governments were badly frayed. United States military forces occupied Mexican territory twice, nearly bringing the two nations to outright warfare for the first time since 1848. Revolutionary violence and radicalism transformed the ways that much of the American population and its government perceived their border with Mexico and provided a rationale for the increasingly brutal treatment of Mexican-descent people in the United States. The Mexican Revolution was a turning point for Mexico, the United States, and their shared border.

DOCUMENTS

The tumult of the revolution, as well as the rapid economic development of the U.S. Southwest and Mexican North in the decades beforehand, led to a dramatic increase in Mexican migration to the United States. Indeed, this migration continues to the present, pausing only in the 1930s because of the Great Depression, and forced expulsion campaigns directed at ethnic Mexicans. In Document 1, journalist Samuel Bryan describes Mexican migration in the early 1910s. He captures the way that Mexicans were treated by their employers and the social tensions that their expanded settlements provoked. How would you characterize Bryan's attitude toward his subjects? Can his depiction of them as passive and content to live in squalor be reconciled with their willingness to migrate and to work in low-paying and arduous jobs?

Many of the Mexicans who came to the United States in the 1910s were deeply involved with different factions of the Mexican Revolution. Such was the case with Flores de Andrade, whose memories of political activism in Chihuahua and El Paso are excerpted in Document 2. Born into a life of privilege, Andrade turned against the Díaz dictatorship, at great risk to herself. Like many of the regime's opponents, she found refuge in the United States and used the American side of the border as a base from which to struggle against the regime.

Many more left Mexico for economic reasons. In Document 3, Anastacio Torres, a native of Guanajuato, recounts his varied experiences in the United States. He entered the United States through El Paso, whose railroad connections made it the largest point of entry for Mexicans, and eventually settled in California, the major destination for Mexicans, after working in a number of states. His ambivalent feelings toward the Mexican government, Americans, and Mexican-Americans were widely shared by Mexican migrants.

Mexicans in the United States, along with Mexican Americans, were treated as racial outcasts and exploitable laborers. Even as their numbers grew with the flight from the Revolution, the harshness of their treatment in the United States increased. In certain areas—southern California, northern New Mexico, and much of the Texas border region—Mexican-descent people had maintained substantial political and economic power for decades after the U.S. conquest of the Southwest in 1848. In these enclaves, they maintained themselves as independent landowners, voters, and elected officials. By 1910, however, segregation, disfranchisement, and economic dislocation had come to even these places. In south Texas, in 1915, dispossessed Tejanos launched a revolt against Anglo-American dominance, one that was associated with the Plan of San Diego, a manifesto supposedly drafted in San Diego, Texas, that is reproduced in Document 4. (These events are described at greater length in the second essay in this chapter.) The manifesto captures the grievances of ethnic Mexicans in Texas and reflects the belief—inspired by the Mexican Revolution—that redress could be found through armed struggle.

The Plan of San Diego uprising was not the only organized violence associated with the Mexican Revolution that took place on U.S. territory. On March 9, 1916, General Francisco "Pancho" Villa led a force of some five hundred in an attack on Columbus, New Mexico, engaging U.S. cavalry units in pitched battle. This attack, intended to punish the United States government for what Villa believed to be its support for his rival Venustiano Carranza and its interference in Mexican affairs, prompted U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to dispatch ten thousand soldiers to track down and capture Villa. Document 5 is his announcement of this punitive expedition. It is most notable for its understatement: Wilson is careful to describe the goals of the military intervention in limited terms, as applying only to Villa and not representing an invasion, as in 1846. Nevertheless, nationalist sentiment in Mexico forced Carranza to demand the withdrawal of American military forces, and the two nations reached the brink of war later that year. Wilson withdrew the expedition in early 1917, having failed entirely to capture Villa or defeat his faction of the revolution.

The Plan of San Diego and Villa's raid shaped other events in the borderlands, as was the case in Bisbee, Arizona, in 1917. As many as 90 percent of the

copper-mining workers in the town had joined a strike aimed at increasing pay, improving safety, and ending the blacklisting of union members. This action, by a polyglot workforce comprised of Anglo-Americans, European immigrants, and Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, also threatened a long-standing dual-wage system that confined ethnic Mexicans to the most dangerous and low-paying jobs. Working closely with the mining companies, local law enforcement authorities assembled an enormous posse of some two thousand (nearly all Anglo-American), which then forcibly placed the strikers (90 percent of whom were born outside the United States) in boxcars, in which they were taken to the New Mexico desert, some 180 miles away, and dumped. This action, known as the "Bisbee Deportation," was condemned by labor leaders, many newspaper editorialists, and the federal government. Nevertheless, it broke the strike, crippled organized labor in Arizona for a generation, and hardened the lines between Whites and Mexicans. Document 6 is the testimony of county sheriff Harry Wheeler, one of the chief architects of the deportation, to a U.S. Senate committee. Wheeler's explanation for his actions reveals the extent to which the Mexican Revolution prompted the fear—and perhaps a pretext—for such extreme measures. Many Americans had come to see Mexican migration and the still easily crossed border as a threat.

Concerns about border security and opposition to immigration (largely from southern and eastern Europe) by native-born Americans prompted Congress to enact systematic immigration legislation in 1917. Document 7 is an excerpt of the text of the Immigration Act of 1917. This measure was the most restrictive immigration legislation in American history. It continued the practice of excluding almost all Asians, made literacy a requirement for entry, and created a long list of reasons for barring entry into the United States. These reasons gave immigration inspectors enormous latitude in their decisions of who to admit and who to exclude, as they included factors difficult to evaluate, such as insanity, alcoholism, anarchism, and the likelihood that people would not be able to support themselves.

The 1917 Immigration Act was directed primarily at European migrants entering the United States by ship. The land borders were still lightly patrolled by today's standards, with official crossing and inspection stations isolated and avoidable. In some places, however, local authorities took more aggressive measures of inspection of border crossers. In El Paso, Texas, customs officials were particularly wary of Mexican border-crossers. By 1917 they had implemented a policy of making some migrants take baths in gasoline if they wanted to cross the border. Carmelita Torres, who crossed daily into El Paso from its sister city of Juárez to clean houses, refused to submit to this procedure, finding it humiliating and unsafe. As reported in the newspaper account of the Bath Riots reproduced in Document 8, her refusal prompted hundreds of protesting women to block traffic into El Paso and to clash with American and Mexican authorities trying to disperse them. Despite the mocking tone of the newspaper's coverage, the protestors' actions resonated with the increasing numbers of people subjected to what they considered humiliating treatment. Why might this scene have prompted an onlooker to yell "Viva Villa"?

1. Samuel Bryan Analyzes Increases in Mexican Immigration, 1912

Previous to 1900 the influx of Mexicans was comparatively unimportant. It was confined almost exclusively to those portions of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California which are near the boundary line between Mexico and the United States. Since these states were formerly Mexican territory and have always possessed a considerable Mexican population, a limited migration back and forth across the border was a perfectly natural result of the existing blood relationship. During the period from 1880 to 1900 the Mexican-born population of these border states increased from 66,312 to 99,969—a gain of 33,657 in twenty years. This increase was not sufficient to keep pace with the growth of the total population of the states. Since 1900, however, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of Mexican immigration, and also some change in its geographical distribution.

In 1908, it was estimated that from 60,000 to 100,000 Mexicans entered the United States each year. This estimate, however, should be modified by the well-known fact that each year a considerable number of Mexicans return to Mexico. Approximately 50 percent of those Mexicans who find employment as section hands upon the railroads claim the free transportation back to El Paso which is furnished by the railroad companies to those who have been in their employ six months or a year. Making allowance for this fact, it would be conservative to place the yearly accretion of population by Mexican immigration at from 35,000 to 70,000. It is probable, therefore, that the Mexican-born population of the United States has trebled since the census of 1900 was taken.

This rapid increase within the last decade has resulted from the expansion of industry both in Mexico and in the United States. In this country the industrial development of the Southwest has opened up wider fields of employment for unskilled laborers in transportation, agriculture, mining, and smelting. A similar expansion in northern Mexico has drawn many Mexican laborers from the farms of other sections of the country farther removed from the border, and it is an easy matter to go from the mines and section gangs of northern Mexico to the more remunerative employment to be had in similar industries of the southwestern United States. Thus the movement from the more remote districts of Mexico to the newly developed industries of the North has become largely a stage in a more general movement to the United States. Entrance into this country is not difficult, for employment agencies in normal times have stood ready to advance board, lodging, and transportation to a place where work was to be had, and the immigration officials have usually deemed no Mexican likely to become a public charge so long as this was the case. This was especially true before 1908...

Most of the Mexican immigrants have at one time been employed as railroad laborers. At present they are used chiefly as section hands and as members of construction gangs, but a number are also to be found working as common laborers about the shops and powerhouses. Although a considerable number are

Samuel Bryan, "Mexican Immigrants in the United States," *Survey* 20 (Sep. 1912): 726, 730. As excerpted in *Major Problems in Mexican-American History*, 212-214.

employed as helpers, few have risen above unskilled labor in any branch of the railroad service. As section hands on the two more important systems they were paid a uniform wage of \$1.00 per day from their first employment in 1902 until 1909, except for a period of about one year previous to the financial stringency of 1907, when they were paid \$1.25 per day. In 1909 the wages of all Mexican section hands employed upon the Santa Fe lines were again raised to \$1.25 per day. The significant feature is, however, that as a general rule they have earned less than the members of any other race similarly employed. For example, 2,455 Mexican section hands from whom data were secured by the Immigration Commission in 1908 and 1909, 2,111, or 85.9 percent, were earning less than \$1.25 per day, while the majority of the Greeks, Italians, and Japanese earned more than \$1.25 and a considerable number more than \$1.50 per day.

In the arid regions of the border states where they have always been employed and where the majority of them still live, the Mexicans come into little direct competition with other races, and no problems of importance result from their presence. But within the last decade their area of employment has expanded greatly. They are now used as section hands as far east as Chicago and as far north as Wyoming. Moreover, they are now employed to a considerable extent in the coal mines of Colorado and New Mexico, in the ore mines of Colorado and Arizona, in the smelters of Arizona, in the cement factories of Colorado and California, in the beet sugar industry of the last mentioned states, and in fruit growing and canning in California. In these localities they have at many points come into direct competition with other races, and their low standards have acted as a check upon the progress of the more assertive of these.

Where they are employed in other industries, the same wage discrimination against them as was noted in the case of railroad employees is generally apparent where the work is done on an hour basis, but no discrimination exists in the matter of rates for piecework. As pieceworkers in the fruit canneries and in the sugar beet industry the proverbial sluggishness of the Mexicans prevents them from earning as much as the members of other races. In the citrus fruit industry their treatment varies with the locality. In some instances they are paid the same as the "whites"—in others the same as the Japanese, according to the class with which they share the field of employment. The data gathered by the Immigration Commission show that although the earnings of Mexicans employed in the other industries are somewhat higher than those of the Mexican section hands, they are with few exceptions noticeably lower than the earnings of Japanese, Italians, and members of the various Slavic races who are similarly employed. This is true in the case of smelting, ore mining, coal mining, and sugar refining. Specific instances of the use of Mexicans to curb the demands of other races are found in the sugar beet industry of central California, where they were introduced for the purpose of showing the Japanese laborers that they were not indispensable, and in the same industry in Colorado, where they were used in a similar way against the German-Russians. Moreover, Mexicans have been employed as strikebreakers in the coal mines of Colorado and New Mexico, and in one instance in the shops of one important railroad system.

Socially and politically the presence of large numbers of Mexicans in this country gives rise to serious problems. The reports of the Immigration Commissions

show that they lack ambition, are to a very large extent illiterate in their native language, are slow to learn English, and most cases show no political interest. In some instances, however, they have been organized to serve the purposes of political bosses, as for example in Phoenix, Arizona. Although more of them are married and have their families with them than is the case among the south European immigrants, they are unsettled as a class, move readily from place to place, and do not acquire or lease land to any extent. But their most unfavorable characteristic is their inclination to form colonies and live in a clannish manner. Wherever a considerable group of Mexicans are employed, they live together, if possible, and associate very little with members of other races. In the mining towns and other small industrial communities they live ordinarily in rude adobe huts outside of the town limits. As section hands they of course live as the members of the other races have done, in freight cars fitted with windows and bunks, or in rough shacks along the line of the railroad. In the cities their colonization has become a menace.

In Los Angeles the housing problem centers largely in the cleaning up or demolition of the Mexican "house courts," which have become the breeding ground of disease and crime, and which have now attracted a considerable population of immigrants of other races. It is estimated that approximately 2,000 Mexicans are living in these "house courts." Some 15,000 persons of this race are residents of Los Angeles and vicinity. Conditions of life among the immigrants of the city, which are molded to a certain extent by Mexican standards, have been materially improved by the work of the Los Angeles Housing Commission. However, the Mexican quarter continues to offer a serious social problem to the community.

In conclusion it should be recognized that although the Mexicans have proved to be efficient laborers in certain industries, and have afforded a cheap and elastic labor supply for the southwestern United States, the evils to the community at large which their presence in large numbers almost invariably brings may more than overbalance their desirable qualities. Their low standards of living and of morals, their illiteracy, their utter lack of proper political interest, the retarding effect of their employment upon the wage scale of the more progressive races, and finally their tendency to colonize in urban centers, with evil results, combine to stamp them as a rather undesirable class of residents.

2. Flores de Andrade Recalls Her Revolutionary Activity as an Immigrant in El Paso, Texas, 1931

I was born in Chihuahua, [Mexico,] and spent my infancy and youth on an estate in Coahuila which belonged to my grandparents. As I was healthy and happy I would run over the estate. I rode on a horse bareback and wasn't afraid of anything. I was thirteen years of age when my grandparents died, leaving me a good inheritance.

Manuel Gamio, *The Mexican Immigrant: His Life-Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 29-35. As excerpted in *Major Problems in Mexican-American History*, 209-211.
© University of Chicago Press. Reprinted by permission.

The first thing that I did, in spite of the fact that my sister and my aunt advised me against it, was to give absolute liberty on my lands to all the peons. I declared free of debts all of those who worked on the lands which my grandparents had willed me and what there was on that fifth part, such as grain, agricultural implements and animals, I divided in equal parts among the peons. I also told them that they could go on living on those lands in absolute liberty without paying me anything....

Because I divided my property, my aunt and even my sister began to annoy me.

They annoyed me so much that I decided to marry, marrying a man of German origin. I lived very happily with my husband until he died, leaving me a widow with six children. Twelve years had gone by in the mean time. I then decided to go to Chihuahua, to the capital of the state, and there ... I began to fight for liberal ideals, organizing a women's club which was called the "Daughters of Cuauhtemoc," a semi-secret organization which worked with the Liberal Party ... in fighting the dictatorship of Don Porfirio Díaz.

My political activities caused greater anger among the members of my family.... Under these conditions I grew poorer and poorer until I reached extreme poverty. I passed four bitter years in Chihuahua suffering economic want on the one hand and fighting in defense of the ideals on the other. My relatives would tell me not to give myself in fighting for the people, because I wouldn't get anything from it.... I didn't care anything about that.... I would have gone on fighting for the cause which I considered to be just.

My economic situation in Chihuahua became serious, so that I had to accept donations of money which were given to me as charity by wealthy people ... who knew me and my relatives....

Finally after four years' stay in Chihuahua, I decided to come to El Paso, Texas. I came in the first place to see if I could better my economic condition and secondly to continue fighting in that region in favor of the Liberal ideals ... to plot against the dictatorship of Don Porfirio. I came to El Paso ... together with my children and comrade Pedro Mendoza....

With comrade Mendoza we soon began the campaign of Liberal propaganda. We lived in the same house ... and as we went about together all day working in the Liberal campaign the American authorities forced us to marry. I am now trying to divorce myself from my husband for he hasn't treated me right....

... A group of comrades founded in El Paso a Liberal women's club. They made me president of that group, and soon afterwards I began to carry on the propaganda work in El Paso and in Ciudad Juarez.... I took charge of collecting money, clothes, medicines and even ammunition and arms to begin to prepare for the revolutionary movement, for the uprisings were already starting in some places.

The American police and the Department of Justice began to suspect our activities and soon began to watch out for me, but they were never able to find either in my house or in the offices of the club documents or arms or anything....

In 1910, when all those who were relatives of those who had taken up arms were arrested by order of the Mexican federal authorities, I had to come to Ciudad Juarez.... I was then put into prison, but soon was let out and I went back to El Paso to continue the fight....

... Sr. Madero ... came to El Paso, pursued by the Mexican and American authorities. He came to my house with some others. I couldn't hide them in my house, but got a little house ... and put them there.

... One day Don Francisco Madero entrusted my husband to go to a Mexican farm on the shore of the Bravo river so as to bring two men who were coming to reach an agreement concerning the movement. My husband ... didn't go. Then I offered my services to Sr. Madero and I went for the two men who were on this side of the border, ... in Texan territory.... Two Texan rangers who had followed me asked me where I was going, and I told them to a festival and they asked me to invite them. I took them to the festival and there managed to get them drunk; then I took away the two men and brought them to Don Francisco. Then I went back to the farm and brought the Rangers to El Paso where I took them drunk to the City Hall and left them there.

Later when everything was ready for the revolutionary movement against the dictatorship, Don Francisco and all those who accompanied him decided to pass over to Mexican territory. I prepared an afternoon party so as to disguise the movement. They all dressed in masked costumes as if for a festival and then we went towards the border. The river was very high and it was necessary to cross over without hesitating for the American authorities were already following us... Finally, mounting a horse barebacked, I took charge of taking those who were accompanying Don Francisco over two by two. They crossed over to a farm and there they remounted for the mountains.

A woman companion and I came back to the American side, for I received instructions to go on with the campaign. This happened the 18 of May, 1911. We slept there in the house of the owner of the ranch and on the next day when we were getting ready to leave, the Colonel came with a picket of soldiers. I told the owner of the ranch to tell him that he didn't know me... When the authorities camp up..., the owner of the ranch said that he didn't know me and I said that I didn't know him. They then asked me for my name and I gave it to them. They asked me what I was doing there and I said that I had been hunting and showed them two rabbits that I had shot. They then took away my ... rifle and my pistol and told me that they had orders to shoot me because I had been conspiring against Don Porfirio. I told them that was true and that they should shoot me right away because otherwise I was going to lose courage. The Colonel, however, sent for instructions from his general.... He sent orders that I should be shot at once.

This occurred almost on the shores of the Rio Grande and my family already had received a notice of what was happening to me and went to make pleas to the American authorities.... They were already making up the squad to shoot me when the American Consul arrived and asked me if I could show that I

was an American citizen so that they couldn't shoot, but I didn't want to do that I told them that I was a Mexican....

The Colonel told me to make my will for they were going to execute me. I told him that I didn't have anything more than my six children whom I will to the Mexican people....

The Colonel was trying to stave off my execution so that he could save me, he said. An officer then came and said that the General was approaching. The Colonel said that it would be well to wait until the chief came so that he could decide concerning my life, but a corporal told him that they should shoot me at once for if the general came and they had not executed me then they would be blamed.... The corporal who was interested in having me shot was going to fire when I took the Colonel's rifle away from him and menaced him; he then ordered the soldiers to throw their rifles at the feet of the Mexican woman..., for the troops of the General were already coming. I gathered up the rifles and crossed the river in my little buggy. There the American authorities arrested me and took me to Fort Bliss.... On the next day the authorities at Fort Bliss received a telegram from President Taft in which he ordered me to be put at liberty, and they sent me home, a negro military band accompanying me through the streets.

At the triumph of the cause of Sr. Madero we had some great festivities in Ciudad Juarez....

Afterwards Sr. Madero sent for me and asked me what I wanted. I told him that I wanted the education of my six children and that all the promises which had been made to the Mexican people should be carried out.

During the Huerta revolution I kept out of the struggle, ... and little by little I have been separating myself from political affairs.

3. Mexican Migrant Describes Working Life in the United States, 1927

ANASTACIO TORRES

I was about seventeen years old, in 1911, when I came to the United States with my brother-in-law. I had worked until then as a clerk in a small store in my home town and also knew something about farm work. My brother-in-law managed to get me across the border without much trouble. We crossed the border at Ciudad Juarez and when we got to El Paso, Texas, we signed ourselves up for work in Kansas. We first went to work on the railroad and they paid us there \$1.35 for nine hours of work a day. As that work was very hard I got a job in a packing house where I began by earning \$1.25 a day for eight hours work but I got to earning as much as \$2.00 when the foreman saw that I was intelligent and that I was very

careful about my work. They almost always paid me a cent or two more an hour than my companions and as I was intelligent they didn't give me the hardest jobs.

I was educated in a Catholic school and if it hadn't been that my mother was poor, I might perhaps have been a doctor or a lawyer, for I was one of the most advanced in the school. I even learned how to help to say mass although that has hardly helped me in any way in this country. I keep on being Catholic although I don't go to church very often. I was married to a girl from La Piedad, Michoacan, in Kansas City. She died there after we had been married about a year, leaving our little son. While working in the packing plant I broke my leg and then I wanted to collect damages but I wasn't able to. I was thinking of going to ask the Mexican Consul there to help me but some countrymen told me not to go to that Consul because he didn't help anybody. At about that time the time of the Great War came and they gave me a war registry questionnaire. They wanted me to go to the war with the American army but I told them that I wasn't an American. They then asked me why I lived in this country and they kept on trying to persuade me. I told them that I had a son and finally, so that they wouldn't keep on bothering me, I went to California where a brother of mine was. I worked for a long time in California and then I did register for the draft, but at the same time declaring that I was a Mexican citizen and that I wasn't willing to change my citizenship. I was in the Imperial Valley, in Calipatria. I worked there first as a laborer with some Japanese. As they are very good and intelligent they showed me how to run all the agricultural implements, a thing which I learned easily with my intelligence. About the end of 1918 I went to Ciudad Juarez for my sister and her children. My father also came with her. Then we went to Calipatria and the whole family of us engaged in cotton picking. They paid very well at that time. They paid us \$2.00 or \$1.75 for every 100 pounds of cotton which we picked and as all of the family picked we managed to make a good amount every day. When the cotton crop of 1919 was finished we went to Los Angeles and then I got a job as a laborer with a paper manufacturing company. They paid me \$3.40 a day for eight hours work. I was at that work for some time and then returned to the Imperial Valley for lemon picking. They paid me \$3.00 a day for eight hours work. I became acquainted with a young lady in Valley from San Francisco del Rincon, Guanajuato, and was married to her. This was my second marriage. In 1921 a Japanese friend for whom I was working as a laborer told me to keep the farm, for he was going to go soon. The owner of the land who was an American furnished the land, the water and the seeds, and we went on halves on the other expenses. Half of the crop was his and half mine. The first planting that I made was of 13 acres of lettuce. I also planted squash and tomatoes. We did very well on those for the crops turned out first class. I don't have anything to say against the Japanese for they have been very good people to me. They showed me how to use a plow, the cultivator, the disc and the planting machines and they have been my best bosses. Neither can I complain of the Americans, for in Kansas City when I was working in the packing plant, as well as in Los Angeles and wherever I have been and have worked with them they have treated me.

Afterwards, encouraged by the first good crop that I got, I rented forty acres of land at \$30 a year for each acre. I had to furnish the water and the seed and

this time things went bad time for me. The crop wasn't any good, the seed was lost and I had to go and look for work elsewhere. I went from one place to another working in different ways. At times I earned \$2.00 a day and at others as much as \$4.00. Recently I had a job as a gardener in Beverly Hills. I was very well there, for they paid me \$4.00 a day for taking care of the garden. I also had a piece of land on which I could plant vegetables, which also bought in something. But one day they told me that as I wasn't American citizen they were going to take away my job and put an American in my place. Then I went back to cultivating some land with an American. I planted forty acres again on halves. The crops turned out well, but the American took the products to a packing house which went bankrupt, so my partner and I were left without anything.

"I believe in God, but I have my doubts, for I was convinced in the Catholic school that all those beliefs are useless. They exploit the poor man anyway and steal his work."

He has had four children by his second wife, so that he has five children in all. He has baptized all of them according to what he says. He says that his wife is and isn't a Catholic, for she doesn't go to church very often nor does she have any saints in the house. Referring to his first days in school he says:

"I might perhaps have been a lawyer or a doctor if my parents had even sent me to a government school. But the school where I was was Catholic and they had us praying all day. As I was the most advanced in the class, for I had learned to read in less than a year, the parish priest taught me how to say Mass. I was getting big then and saw that they didn't do anything but pray in the school so I once asked the teacher to show me something about numbers so that I could keep accounts I was then given some multiplication, which was foolish, for I couldn't even add. I then told the teacher that perhaps he himself couldn't do that multiplication and for that reason I stopped going to school.

"I don't have anything against the *pochos*, but the truth is that although they are Mexicans, for they are of our own blood because their parents were Mexicans, they pretend that they are Americans. They only want to talk in English and they speak Spanish very poorly. That is why I don't like them.

4. South Texas Rebels Issue Manifesto, "The Plan of San Diego," 1915

"We will rise in arms against ... the United States."

—Plan of San Diego
(January 6, 1915)

1. On the 20th day of February, 1915, at 2 o'clock in the morning, we will rise in arms against the Government and country of the United States and North

America, one as all and all as one, proclaiming the liberty of the individuals of the black race and its independence of Yankee tyranny, which has held us in iniquitous slavery since remote times; and at the same time and in the same manner we will proclaim the independence and segregation of the States bordering on the Mexican nation, which are: Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California, of which States the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American imperialism.

2. In order to render the foregoing clause effective, the necessary army corps will be formed under the immediate command of military leaders named by the supreme revolutionary congress of San Diego, Texas, which shall have full power to designate a supreme chief who shall be at the head of said army. The banner which shall guide us in this enterprise shall be red, with a white diagonal fringe, and bearing; the following inscription: "Equality and Independence"; and none of the subordinate leaders or subalterns shall use any other flag (except only the white for signals). The aforesaid army shall be known by the name of "Liberating Army for Races and Peoples."

3. Each one of the chiefs will do his utmost by whatever means possible, to get possession of the arms and funds of the cities which he has beforehand been designated to capture in order that our cause may be provided with resources to continue the fight with better success, the said leaders each being required to render an account of everything; to his superiors, in order that the latter may dispose of it in the proper manner.

4. The leader who may take a city must immediately name and appoint municipal authorities, in order that they may preserve order and assist in every way possible the revolutionary movement. In case the capital of any State which we are endeavoring to liberate be captured; there will be named in the same manner superior municipal authorities: for the same purpose.

5. It is strictly forbidden to hold prisoners, either special prisoners (civilians) or soldiers; and the only time that should be spent in dealing with them is that which is absolutely necessary to demand funds (loans) of them; and whether these demands be successful or not, they shall shot immediately, without any pretext.

6. Every stranger who shall be found armed and who can not prove his right to carry arms, shall be summarily executed, regardless of race or nationality.

7. Every North American over 16 years of age shall be put to death, and only the aged men, the women and children shall be respected. And on no account shall the traitors to our race be respected or spared.

8. The Apaches of Arizona, as well as the Indians (red skins) of the territory shall be given every guarantee, and their lands which have been taken from them shall be returned to them, to the end that they may assist us in the cause which we defend.

9. All appointments and grades in our army which are exercised by subordinate officers (subalterns) shall be examined (recognized) by the superior officers. There shall likewise be recognized the grades of leaders of other complots which may not be connected with this, and who may wish to co-operate with us; also those who may affiliate with us later.

10. The movement having gathered force, and once having possessed ourselves of the States above alluded to, we shall proclaim them an independent republic, later requesting, if it be thought expedient, annexation to Mexico without concerning ourselves at that time about the of government which may control the destinies of the common other country.

11. When we shall have obtained independence for the negroes we shall grant them a banner which they themselves shall be permitted to select, and we shall aid them in obtaining six States of the American Union, which States border upon those already mentioned, and they may from these six States form a republic and they may therefore be independent.

12. None of the leaders shall have power to make terms with the enemy without first communicating with the superior officers of the enemy, bearing in mind that this is a war without quarter, nor shall any leader enroll in his ranks any stranger unless said stranger belongs to Latin, the negro or the Japanese race.

13. It is understood that none of the members of this complot (or any one who may come in later) shall upon the definite triumph of the cause which we defend, fail to recognize their superiors, nor shall they aid others who with bastard designs may endeavor to destroy what has been accomplished with such great work.

14. As soon as possible each local society (junta) shall nominate delegates, who shall meet at a time and place beforehand designated; for the purpose of nominating a permanent directorate of the revolutionary movement. At this meeting shall be determined and worked out in detail: the powers and duties of the permanent directorate and this revolutionary plan may be revised or amended.

15. It is understood among those who may follow this movement that we will carry as a singing voice the independence of the negroes, placing obligations upon both races, and that on no account shall we accept aid, either moral or pecuniary, from the government of Mexico, and it need not consider itself under any obligations in this, our movement.

EQUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE.

5. President Woodrow Wilson Sends U.S. Army into Mexico, 1916

The Secretary of State to All American Consular Offices in Mexico

Washington, March 10, 1916.

The following statement has just been given to the press by the President:

An adequate force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays. This can and will be done in entirely friendly aid of the constituted authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that Republic.

6. Sheriff Justifies Deporting Striking Miners from Arizona Town, 1917

SENATOR FALL. Did you regard the position at that time (1917) in the town of Bisbee, and in that vicinity, as warranting you in calling upon the Federal Government for assistance in the preservation of peace?

CAPT. WHEELER. I did.

SENATOR FALL. In connection with your activities and the performance of your duties as peace officer, were your actions thereafter investigated by any commission or department of the Government of the United States?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. By whom were your acts investigated aside from any subsequent court proceedings?

CAPT. WHEELER. Secretary of Labor Wilson and a man by the name of Frankfurter—Felix Frankfurter, I believe—Marsh, and I forget the other name.

SENATOR FALL. They constituted what was known as the mediation committee appointed by the President of the United States, were they not?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. In connection with this occurrence at Bisbee to which we have just been referring, did you come in contact with any citizens of Old Mexico?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. Were such Mexicans involved in these occurrences at Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. A great many.

SENATOR FALL. What did you learn from these Mexicans, if anything in reference to their action, and proposed action as to the causes leading them to pursue the course which they were pursuing?

CAPT. WHEELER. You understand, Senator, that a sheriff will frequently have stories related to him, both correct and incorrect, many of which he is unable personally to run down, but I was frequently told that the Mexicans of the Villa army had cached arms and ammunition in the mountains of Sonora, upon their retreat from Sonora; that many of these Mexicans were former Villa soldiers, and knew

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Investigation of Mexican affairs: preliminary report and hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, pursuant to S. res. 106, directing the Committee on Foreign Relations to investigate the matter of outrages on citizens of the United States in Mexico* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920): vol. 2, pp. 1882-1886.

where these caches were and intended to secure them at the proper time. I personally heard one Mexican—if you will remember a few weeks before that, or a month or two, the Mexicans ran the Americans out of Cananea, Sonora.

SENATOR FALL. Drove them out?

CAPT. WHEELER. Drove them out.

SENATOR FALL. The Americans took refuge on the American side.

CAPT. WHEELER. Most of them at Bisbee. After six weeks or two months, when peace was restored in Cananea, a great many of the Mexicans came into Bisbee. I heard one Mexican distinctly, heard him remark to an American workman going up the hill with his lunch pail: "We run you out of Cananea a short while ago; we will run you out of here." That is one of the remarks I heard.

SENATOR FALL. Did you hear what character of arms and ammunition had been cached by the Villistas in the mountains?

CAPT. WHEELER. I heard that, he had left most of his artillery in the mountains, but the arms spoken of at that time were their rifles. Most of his men were armed with Mausers.

SENATOR FALL. From information which you obtained through your deputies, and which you regarded as a reliable source, was the purpose disclosed of using those arms in connection with trouble at Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. When the proper moment arose.

SENATOR FALL. Did you ever hear of the plan of San Diego, Captain?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. Where did you first hear of it, do you know?

CAPT. WHEELER. I heard of it in various places. The time I remember best of all was in Tombstone. I heard a Mexican speak of it and say that the time would soon arrive when this country would be restored to Mexico, and the Mexicans would take their proper station; they would receive what was due them.

SENATOR FALL. That was the first time you heard of the plan of San Diego?

CAPT. WHEELER. I don't know that it was the first time; it was the time most distinct in my memory; I remember the Mexican and his looks; he was a stranger in town.

SENATOR FALL. By this country being restored to Mexico he meant Arizona?

CAPT. WHEELER. Arizona and these border States.

SENATOR FALL. The border States which had formerly been a part of Mexico; and at Bisbee you heard at least one Mexican say that in a short time—they had run these American miners out of Cananea—in a short time they would run them out of Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. "We ran you out of Cananea; we will run you out of here."

SENATOR FALL. How many—about how many Mexican miners were there in Bisbee during these disturbances?

CAPT. WHEELER. Oh, that would be hard to say; I have seen about—extending probably four or five hundred yards in length, column of twos, each day marching up to the I. W. W. headquarters to receive their rations. The I. W. W. was feeding them, all of them on strike.

SENATOR FALL. These were Mexicans?

CAPT. WHEELER. Mexicans; and, of course, a great many Mexicans did not cease work, and there were many Mexicans in camp not interested one way or another.

SENATOR FALL. Now, who were these Mexicans who were being fed by the I. W. W., as near as you could ascertain; where were they from?

CAPT. WHEELER. I believed, and still believe, the majority of them were former Villistas.

SENATOR FALL. Soldiers in Villa's army?

CAPT. WHEELER. Ex-soldiers.

SENATOR FALL. And you had reasons to believe that more than one of them knew of the arms which had been left by Villa?

CAPT. WHEELER. Absolutely.

SENATOR FALL. Did you have any reason to fear that some arms might be used by these Mexicans in connection with threatened disturbances at Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir; I did.

SENATOR FALL. Was this one of the reasons that guided you in pursuing the course which you did with reference to the lawless element at Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. It was.

SENATOR FALL. Then there were several hundred Mexicans, who, as near as you could ascertain—the largest proportion of whom, as near as you could ascertain, had been with Villa, who were in Bisbee being fed by the I. W. W.?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. And who were causing the disturbance there?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. Now, do you know of any statement being made by the I. W. W. who were there to the Mexicans with reference to their purpose—how it would affect the Mexicans themselves?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. What statement do you know of?

CAPT. WHEELER. I had arrested A. E. Embree, I believe under indictment now in the Federal court, one of the leaders of the I. W. W. He was brought to Tucson and tried in this court and acquitted by a jury; I believe eight of the jury were Mexicans, but during that trial the statement was sworn to by a Mexican whose name was Peralta—Antonio Peralta—saying that the Mexicans were induced to quit work. This was subsequent, all having been told by these head men in Bisbee, that it was to their interest that Germany should win the war; it was to the interest of the Mexicans and to Mexico that Germany should win the war. That was the inducement to them to cease work by the head men. That testimony can be corroborated because it is in the court records here in Tucson.

SENATOR FALL. Do you know whether the Mexican citizens passed backward and forward with comparative freedom across the line between Cananea and Bisbee about this time? You spoke of some.

CAPT. WHEELER. It is much more difficult now than it was in those days. In those days anyone could go a mile east or west of these ports and cross.

SENATOR FALL. The country is not very thickly settled?

CAPT. WHEELER. No, sir.

SENATOR FALL. And there is no canal or river such as exists below El Paso on the international boundary?

CAPT. WHEELER. No, sir.

SENATOR FALL. The boundary line between Arizona and Old Mexico generally, particularly that portion within your jurisdiction, simply is an imaginary line, marked by monuments, and in some places by wire fences?

MR. WHEELER. By wire fences; yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. Now, Captain, to refer back a moment to what was known as the Bisbee trouble, resulting later in what was known as the Bisbee deportation cases, you took action upon your own initiative finally after appealing to both the State and the National Government, which was investigated by this committee of which you have spoken?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. That action resulted in the driving out, or escorting out of Bisbee of quite a large number of people whom you regarded as threatening to disturb the peace of other law-abiding citizens of Bisbee?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir; and in the interest of the country, which at that time was in war.

SENATOR FALL. And threatening to cut off the production of copper, which was necessary to this country in carrying on the war?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. You took the action which you did under those conditions and under that belief?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir. I will state had it been in time of peace that action would not have been taken.

SENATOR FALL. Was the gravity of the situation there, in your judgment, increased by the fact that there were a large number of Mexicans over there from the other side, and the fact that it was claimed that they knew where there were at least a thousand rifles cached which they could avail themselves of at the proper time when that time might arise. Did those facts increase the gravity of the situation as you understood it?

CAPT. WHEELER. Yes, sir; as I said before it was a factor in summing up the situation.

SENATOR FALL. Did you know of arms which could be supplied from any other particular source?

CAPT. WHEELER. Senator, these men, the majority of them, were strangers. We did not know where they came from. We did not know what they had. While I did not see arms on them exactly they would not work around in their shirt sleeves with arms, though they may have had arms in their domicile, or out in the hills in caches.

SENATOR FALL. Did you have information leading you to believe there were any large caches of arms available outside of these which you have mentioned, as available to the Mexicans who were among those strikers?

CAPT. WHEELER. No, sir.

SENATOR FALL. Did you, from what you have learned, and your observation, did you believe—is it your opinion that any number of Mexicans around through the State, Bisbee or elsewhere, Tombstone or elsewhere in Arizona, actually believed that the proper moment would arrive when, through the activities of Mexicans, assisted by others, that a successful attempt might be made to restore Arizona to Mexico?

CAPT. WHEELER. We did not think it would be successful.

SENATOR FALL. No; but did you learn—entertain the idea—that the Mexicans themselves believed it?

CAPT. WHEELER. Oh, yes, sir.

SENATOR FALL. That they were confident that such an opportunity would arise.

CAPT. WHEELER. They even went to the extent of organizing; a working nucleus of organization was called into existence.

SENATOR FALL. In accordance with the general plan of San Diego?

CAPT. WHEELER. And we had rifle clubs in this country formed. At one time we feared they were going to take things into their own hands but that was prevented by this deportation.

7. U.S. Congress Imposes Restrictions on Migration, 1917

CHAP. 29.—An Act To regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

Sec. 2. That there shall be levied, collected, and paid a tax of \$8 for every alien, including alien seamen regularly admitted as provided in this Act, entering the United States: That the said tax shall not be levied on account of aliens who enter the United States after an uninterrupted residence of at least one year immediately preceding such entrance in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Cuba, or the Republic of Mexico, for a temporary stay.

SEC. 3. That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States: All idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons; persons who have had one or more attacks of insanity at any time previously; persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority; persons with chronic alcoholism; paupers; professional beggars; vagrants; persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease; persons not comprehended within any of the foregoing excluded classes who are found to be and are certified by the examining surgeon as being mentally or physically defective, such physical defect being of a nature which may affect the ability of such alien to earn a living; persons who have been convicted of or admit having committed a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; polygamists, or persons who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice of polygamy; anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States, or of all forms of law, or who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized government, or who advocate the assassination of public officials, or who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; persons who are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; prostitutes,

or persons coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose; persons who directly or indirectly procure or attempt to procure or import prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose; persons who are supported by or receive in whole or in part the proceeds of prostitution; persons hereinafter called contract laborers, who have been induced, assisted, encouraged, or solicited to migrate to this country by offers or promises of employment, whether such offers or promises are true or false, or in consequence of agreements, oral, written or printed, express or implied, to perform labor in this country of any kind, skilled or unskilled; persons who have come in consequence of advertisements for laborers printed, published, or distributed in a foreign country; persons likely to become a public charge.

8. Mexican Migrants Protest Gasoline Baths, 1917

Order to Bathe Starts Near Riot Among Juarez Women.

Auburn-Haired Amazon at Santa Fe Street Bridge Leads Feminine Outbreak.

Rumor Among Servant Girls That Quarantine Officers Photograph Bathers in the Altogether Responsible for Wild Scenes.

Luckless Laborer Mistakes Character of Demonstrations, Shouts "Viva Villa," and His Career Is Promptly Ended by Bullets from Carranza Cavalry.

Street Carts Seized and Detained for Hours and Conductors and Motormen, One with a Black Eye, Are Escorted Back to El Paso.

Juarez women, incensed at the American quarantine regulations, led a riot yesterday morning at the Santa Fe Bridge. From the time the street cars began to run until the middle of the afternoon thousands of Mexicans thronged the Juarez side of the river and pushed out to the tollgate on the bridge. Women ringleaders of the mob hurled stones at American civilians, both on the bridge and on the streets of Juarez. Four street cars which crossed into Juarez early in the morning were seized, and the eight members of the crew sent afoot back to El Paso, one of the bringing a black eye and bruised face as a memento. A Villa sympathizer who started a diversion during the excitement by shouting "Death to Carranza! Viva Villa!" was promptly shot by a Carranza soldier. Four bullets took effect, killing him instantly.

Mounted Men Disperse Crowd.

Toward the middle of the afternoon, when the excitement had died down somewhat, mounted men disperse the crowd on the Juarez side of the bridge. American soldiers also forced back the Mexicans on the bridge to the international line at the middle of the river, the Mexicans having previously pushed as far as the tollgate, where they hung over the railing to jeer their compatriots who entered the bathhouse to comply with the requirements.

Street Car Traffic Interrupted.

The street cars which had been stopped in Juarez were brought back about 2 o'clock, undamaged. A Mexican official brought the first one to the middle of the bridge and volunteers were obtained by the street car company to go after the others. Car service to Juarez was resumed about 3 o'clock, but after one car made the trip it was discontinued for the rest of the day.

False Reports Responsible for the Trouble.

When women were ordered to get off the street cars and submit to being bathed and disinfected before passing to the American side the rioting started. Reports were circulated that the women were being insulted in the bathhouse and photographed while nude. The greater part of them refused to go to the bath and became indignant when they were ordered off the street cars after having paid their fares, and could not have their nickels refunded.

Carmelita Torres Leads Demonstration

When refused permission to enter El Paso without complying with the regulations the women collected in an angry crowd at the corner of the bridge. By 8 o'clock the throng, consisting in large part of servant girls employed in El Paso, had grown until it packed the bridge half way across. Led by Carmelita Torres, an auburn-haired young woman of 17, they kept up a continuous volley of language aimed at the immigration and health officers, civilians, sentries, and other visible Americans. Small stones were thrown, but the missiles were little more dangerous than the language. Some few automobiles which braved the fury and pushed through to the other side were showered with mud and stones.

Motormen's Grottesque Revenge

One of the streetcar motormen, finally making his way back to the American side, emerged from the mob with half a dozen women clinging to him endeavoring to drag him down. The controllers of the street cars were carried away by the women and used for weapons or thrown into the river.

Carranza cavalymen were unable during the morning to make any headway against the crowd, although they drew their sabers threateningly. Women laughingly caught their bridles and turned the horses aside, holding the soldiers sabers and whips.

American sentries had to be placed under the bridge to prevent Mexicans from jumping off upon the sand and reaching the American side in that manner. Those sentries were exposed to the marksmanship of a gang of small Mexican boys, who threw sticks and mud.

Carranza Cavalry Arrive

One of the significant incidents of the disturbances across the river yesterday morning was the actions of the Mexican military authorities in parading their forces on Juarez avenue. Not only was the civil population of Juarez permitted to make a disgusting exhibition, but the Mexican soldiers were turned out as though to encourage the civilians in their anti-cleanup demonstration.

A surprisingly large number of soldiers were revealed when the Mexican commander marshaled his forces on the avenue. With the famous skull and crossbones flag of the Murgía division flying and a band playing the forces of General Murgía

made a picturesque showing. Just why they were placed on parade could not be fathomed by the few Americans who happened to see them.

At the American end of the bridge quiet efficiency prevailed. The handful of American soldiers who patrolled the grounds around the customs house continued to walk their beats just as though a seething Latin mob scene was not being enacted a few feet away.

Girls Attack Automobiles

Those who witnessed the actions of the Mexican mob at the end of the bridge will never forget it ... the mob remained bent on destroying anything that came from the American side. As soon as an automobile would cross the line the girls would absolutely cover it. The hands of the feminine mob would claw and tear at the tops of the cars. The glass windows of the autos were torn out, the tops torn to pieces and parts of the fitting such as lamps and horns were torn away. All of this happened in view of the Mexican military, who had a sufficient force at hand to stop any kind of difficulty. But the commanders and the soldiers seemed in sympathy with the mob. The impulse was to injure and insult Americans as much as possible without actually committing murder.

Jose Maria Sanchez Stops Bullets

Later in the morning, when the crowd had grown to several thousand, including a large percentage of men, the Villa sympathizer above mentioned made his unfortunate outbreak and received the four bullets. His name was given as Jose Maria Sanchez, a laborer.

Consul General Garcia Appeals to Crowd

About 10 o'clock, Andres Garcia, Mexican consul general, drove out upon the bridge in his automobile and succeeded, to some extent, in quieting the mob. When he started back to the American side the crowd seized the wheels of his car, endeavoring to keep him on the Mexican side. An automobile carrying mail was turned back when it tried to cross in to Juarez, the crowd refusing to give way and ordering the driver's return to El Paso.

Mexicans Survive Bath

Early in the afternoon, as Mexicans continued to come out of the bathhouse without appreciable injury, the crowd began to break up. Mounted Mexican soldiers drove them away from the river bank and cleared the end of the bridge, allowing none to pass the custom house except those who wished to enter El Paso. Similar restrictions had been put into effect on the American side. Crowds of spectators had gathered near the El Paso end of the bridge to watch the excitement, and groups were strung for some distance along the banks.

Bad Day for Americans

There were few Americans visiting in Juarez yesterday, as the early developments caused immigration officials to warn all who attempted to cross. Dozens turned back every hour on being informed that it was a "bad day for Americans." Some Americans who went to the race track made their return without being interfered with. Others had to run the gauntlet of rocks and abuse, and there were rumors of several Americans resenting insults and being jailed, but these reports were not confirmed. Consul General Garcia, after a trip through Juarez in the afternoon, said there had been no disturbance of

consequence except at the bridge. He said no American had been arrested, and declared that the report of the Villista killed was untrue. He said four shots were fired to frighten rioters.

Amusement Resorts Closed

The race track, gambling houses and amusement places of Juarez were closed all day.

In spite of protests made by so many, there were enough Mexicans who submitted to the orders of the immigration officers to keep the bathhouse and disinfection equipment busy. Each individual who crossed the bridge was questioned and inspected, and the greater part of them ordered to the cleaning house. They came out with clothes wrinkled from the steam sterilizer, hair wet and faces shining, generally laughing and in good humor. The immigration men predict that as soon as the Mexicans become familiar with the bathing process they will not only submit to it but welcome it.

At least one "professional bather" has already been developed by the quarantine. A man of about 60 years was found to be taking his fifth cleansing of the day, with the object of selling the certificates to his countrymen.

Certificates Required of Travelers

The certificates read "United States Public Health Service, Mexican Border Quarantine. The bearer,has been this day deloused, bathed, vaccinated, clothing and baggage disinfected."

No railroad tickets will be issued out of the city to Mexicans unless such certificates are presented. Many Mexicans were refused transportation yesterday for this reason.

The owner of a bathhouse in Juarez was among the instigators of the riot and was seen inciting the women throughout the morning.

Many laughable incidents were reported by the health officers, quoting their conversations with Mexicans ordered to the baths. One argued eloquently that he had bathed well in July. Another put up a logical debate with the officers, alleging there was more typhus in El Paso than Juarez, proving American methods wrong.

ESSAYS

The U.S.-Mexico border played a key role in the Mexican Revolution, and in turn the Revolution transformed the border. In the first essay, Friedrich Katz, formerly a history professor at the University of Chicago, describes how the policies of the Porfirian regime in northern Mexico helped cause the Mexican Revolution. In need of self-sustaining settlements that could form a military bulwark against the formidable Apaches, national leaders had granted many northern settlements more political rights and economic independence than was typical of Mexico's peasantry. These communities governed themselves and enjoyed a comparatively egalitarian distribution of land and livestock. But in the 1880s, the conquest of Apaches and other Indian peoples (described in Chapter 9 of this volume) removed the need for such treatment. Economic development, especially railroads, made northern lands attractive targets for appropriation by

regional elites and leading figures in Díaz's circles. Increasingly alienated by the Díaz regime, northern communities became the mainstay of the Revolution. And they had a critical resource that other regions of Mexico lacked: the border with the United States, which gave them access to arms and sanctuary.

The Revolution had enormous impacts north of the border as well. In the second essay, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee historian Benjamin H. Johnson examines the failed uprising in south Texas associated with the Plan of San Diego (Document 4). The attempted rebellion prompted a massive and violent backlash, one which accelerated the dispossession of Mexican Americans and heightened racial tension with Anglos. On the other hand, Johnson argues, it prompted a key group of Tejanos to seek their rights as American citizens, thus helping to launch a Mexican-American civil rights movement. The Mexican Revolution continued to reverberate in the borderlands and beyond, if in unpredictable ways.

Mexico's Northern Border and the Coming of the Revolution

FRIEDRICH KATZ

Prior to Díaz's assumption of power, the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Coahuila enjoyed a fair measure of autonomous existence. Remote and isolated, not just from the rest of Mexico but from the rest of the world as well, and well-nigh independent politically and self-sufficient economically, they formed the mainstay of Mexico's northern "frontier." In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, with the advent of Díaz and the influx of unprecedented amounts of foreign, especially American, capital into Mexico, the country's northern frontier underwent a radical change when Díaz and the United States, respectively, imposed their political and economic controls on the region. Railway construction, begun in the 1880s, offered the most dramatic piece of evidence of the degree to which the former enclave was to be integrated into the rest of Mexico and the American sphere of influence. The railways illustrated in the most palpable way possible that what had once been a frontier was being transformed into "the border" and that what had once been largely beyond the reach of any country was now within the reach of two countries at once.

The political transformation was launched when Díaz set out to demolish systematically the almost independent principalities that regional caudillos such as Ignacio Pesqueira in Sonora and Luis Terrazas in Chihuahua had established.

The economic transformation was mainly the work of American investments that began pouring into all of Mexico at unprecedented rates during the 1880s. Northern Mexico had always had a large share of this investment. By 1902, for instance, more than 22 percent of all U.S. investment in Mexico had gone into these three northern states, 6.3 percent went to Chihuahua, 7.3 percent to Sonora, and 9.5 percent to Coahuila, primarily in mining, farming, and transportation.

The repercussions of this dual transformation of the frontier, the political and the economic one, caught up most quickly and unkindly with the very people who had done the most to make the frontier habitable in the first place and who were its unique product: the military colonists. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish crown had established military colonies along the northern frontier to fend off roaming bands of Apaches and other nomads. The method employed was always the same: land along this frontier was granted to anyone willing to take possession of it and defend it with his life. In the nineteenth century, Benito Juárez followed this example and established more such colonies.

The inhabitants of the colonies were privileged in many respects compared to the free villagers of central and southern Mexico. Unlike the villagers, they were not wards of the crown during the colonial period but enjoyed rights generally reserved for Spaniards and their descendants, the criollos. They owned their land individually and were allowed to sell it, or buy additional land. They usually owned more land and more cattle than the free peasants of Mexico's other areas. Their communities were entitled to greater internal autonomy, and the military colonists had not only the right but the duty to bear arms.

By 1885 great changes took place in the Mexican frontier region. The Apaches were finally defeated, and the frontier became appreciably quieter. Neither the hacendados nor the government any longer needed the military support of the peasants, but what they felt they did need was the land the peasants had so assiduously reclaimed, and they felt no qualms about turning against their former allies.

After the first railways linked northern Mexico to the central parts of the country and to the United States in 1885, the increasing value of the peasants' land ushered in a wave of expropriation. First hit were the most recently established settlements, but even the oldest and most prestigious ones were not spared. Resentment was acute. "We are deeply concerned that lands we consider our own, since we have received them from our fathers and worked them with our own hands, are now passing into other hands," the inhabitants of the village of Namiquipa wrote to President Díaz in 1908 (without much success).

The northern military communities lost not only their lands but also their cherished political rights, the most precious among them their municipal autonomy. The right of a village to elect its own municipal authorities had been conferred on many settlements in the eighteenth century by the Spanish crown. The right was reconfirmed after independence and extended to newly founded settlements as well. The greatest guarantor of that autonomy, however, was not the official charter of any short-lived government but the atomized and isolated pattern of settlements that prevailed along the frontier until about the mid-nineteenth century. Because it was no longer a factor after Díaz came to power, state authorities were able to disregard with impunity those hallowed rights and traditions and to usurp for themselves the privilege of appointing such officials as the *jefes políticos* (district administrators) and *presidentes municipales* (mayors) at their own discretion.

The loss of municipal autonomy aroused almost as much passion as the loss of land. On 16 November 1910, when the populace of the old frontier village of Cuchillo Parado shouldered their rifles and enlisted in the revolutionary forces, the removal of the mayor who had been imposed on them was the most burning

issue. And it was the removal of a popularly elected mayor by the state authorities and his replacement by a village usurer that drove the inhabitants of the mountain town of Bachíniva in Chihuahua to join the revolution in 1910.

While peasant unrest did not assume revolutionary proportions until 1910, the expropriation of land and the suppression of traditional rights did precipitate sporadic uprisings long before the revolution began. In Chihuahua, for instance, the government lost more than five hundred men in a two-year struggle with about sixty insurgent peasants of the village of Tomochic, who, in 1892, declared themselves bound only by the law of God and revolted against the encroachments of the government.

Repercussions of the frontier transformation affected another group of peasants, the Indian tribes that had managed to retain their lands and a measure of autonomy throughout the Spanish colonial period as well as during the first half-century of independence. Unlike the military colonists who were mainly concentrated in Chihuahua, the most militant Indian tribe came from the neighboring state of Sonora. They were the Yaqui Indians, who inhabited one of the most fertile regions of Sonora, the Yaqui Valley. Several abortive attempts to seize their lands had been made before, but it was not until Díaz came to power that a concentrated offensive was mounted to expel them from their lands. The offensive met with fierce resistance. Long and bloody battles took a heavy toll on both sides, and, although the federal troops finally succeeded in defeating the most formidable force among the Yaquis and in capturing its leader Cajeme, they never managed to root out all guerrilla resistance.

Both of these traditional peasant groups—the frontiersmen and the Indians—thus found themselves helpless in the face of blatant assaults on their property and independence until the turn of the century. The only allies they found before 1900 were former caudillos, landowners who had been ousted from positions of political power.

The peasants, however, did not receive the support of any nonrural classes in these states before 1900. The simple reason was that the transformation of the frontier had beneficial effects for the middle classes and the industrial working class who therefore had little reason to support the fighting peasants. Foreign investment in such projects as railroad construction greatly multiplied the economic opportunities of these classes and, until 1900, brought about a significant rise in real wages. Moreover, Díaz's overthrow of the old political oligarchies had created vacancies that the middle class was able to fill and from which it was able to exercise, for a time at least, some real power, until once more displaced by another emerging oligarchy.

Not until 1900–1910 was the favorable disposition of these groups toward the regime reversed, for, in those ten years, foreign investment began to show its ugly underside. It was accelerating at a breathtaking rate: between 1900 and 1910 investments in Mexico leaped to three times the amount invested between 1876 and 1900. One of the results of this increase was a soaring inflation rate that cut deep into the real wages of the middle and industrial working classes and sharply curtailed the investment opportunities of middle class entrepreneurs by tightening available credit. The government added to the burden on these two

groups when it sought to raise their taxes to make up for the reduced value of taxes paid by foreign investors and the local oligarchy. Another result of increased foreign investment was a heightened vulnerability to the business cycle of the United States, which manifested itself most painfully during the economic crisis of 1907. Again the burden on the middle and working classes was increased by an external factor—the return of thousands of Mexican workers discharged from American mines and factories during each recession.

For the middle classes, falling income and rising taxes constituted only two elements of a rapidly deteriorating social and economic situation. Between 1900 and 1910 their opportunities for upward mobility were dramatically reduced through new political structures implemented by Díaz in northern Mexico. In the last years of his regime Díaz gave up his attempts to divide political from economic power and to limit the political power of the regional oligarchies in their native states. As a result political positions and patronage jobs, which in Mexico had always been crucial to the survival of the middle classes, came under the exclusive control of the state's oligarchies. At the same time these powerful groups exercised an increasing degree of control over regional and local authorities, frequently a traditional fiefdom of the middle classes. Among the latter a profound resentment against the state's oligarchies began to emerge.

Discontent within the industrial working class and the middle classes manifested itself in an upsurge of nationalist sentiment and growing resentment toward foreign investors, who were largely held responsible for their plight, and toward the Díaz regime, which refused to curtail their advance. In the final account, then, despite an auspicious beginning, the transformation of the frontier eroded support for the Díaz regime among the nonrural population.

In this period manifestations of discontent also emerged among a rural group that until then had remained passive and docile to both the large landowners and the state and national governments. These were the traditional hacienda peons, a sector of the agrarian population that, since the colonial period, was proportionately much more prominently represented in the North than anywhere else in the country.

On northern haciendas, an important role was played by yet another group, present in the South only to a limited extent—the vaqueros, or cowboys. Cattle raising, naturally enough, became the chief industry in those regions of northern Mexico where the lack of an adequate water supply had severely checked the spread of agriculture. The vaqueros were well armed and often owned their own horses; they were indeed a privileged class. They were better off than the peasants, many owned their own cattle, which grazed on the hacienda lands, and their opportunities for social mobility were greater than were those of the peasants. For every seven or eight vaqueros, there was a foreman who received twice the salary of a regular cowboy. Anyone who remained on the hacienda long enough had a good chance of rising to this position. On the whole, then, the situation of resident workers on northern haciendas was better than that of their counterparts elsewhere in Mexico, and yet their relations with the hacendados often were more antagonistic.

This antagonism may be explained by the breakdown of the patriarchal relationship between the traditional peon (whose ancestors in most cases had lived on the hacienda for centuries) and the hacendado, a relationship that had characterized both northern and central Mexico for the greater part of the nineteenth century. It continued to characterize central Mexico even during the revolutionary period, for here many peons had become a kind of privileged retainer on haciendas where the bulk of the laborers consisted of expropriated peasants. Such was not the case, however, in the North, for on the eve of the revolution, Luis Terrazas complained bitterly, "Since the beginning of the unrest, I have been trying to arm the peons of my haciendas, but, I must tell you honestly these workers are infected with ideas of revolution and only a few of them are loyal to me. Arming disloyal people, as you shall see, would be counterproductive because they will go over to the enemy with their weapons and equipments." This breakdown of patriarchal bonds on northern estates was not due to a lack of effort on the part of the hacendados to maintain them. Luis Terrazas made it a point to visit each of his haciendas at least once a year. On those occasions a holiday was declared, and the peons lined up to receive him and the gifts he brought. He went to great pains to remember the name and history of each peon.

But the transformation of the frontier tended to vitiate those efforts. First, the traditional patriarchal relationship was strained intolerably by the enormous growth of the estate holdings of Terrazas and other barons of the North, which made it more and more difficult for the landowners to establish personal relationships with their peons. Second, it was drained of much of its meaning with the defeat of the Apaches in 1884. Until then the hacendado, like the medieval lord of Europe, had been able to offer protection from attacks by furnishing his peons with a safe refuge in his thickly fortified *casco* (the central residence hall of the hacienda which in northern Mexico had been built as both a refuge and a fortress) and by sending out retainers to fight the wandering Indian bands. When the attacks ceased, that protection was no longer needed. Characteristically, the one region in northern Mexico where relations between peons and hacendados remained the closest—many hacendados even armed their peons and led them into the revolution—was southern Sonora, where the danger of attacks by rebellious Yaquis persisted. Third, the patriarchal relationship was undermined by the peons' growing awareness of higher wages and better living conditions on ranches in the neighboring United States. Thousands of them, especially *vaqueiros*, left to find work on the ranches of the American Southwest. Those who returned to Mexico did so with fresh doubts about the patriarchal goodness of the Mexican hacendados, who paid them a fraction of what they had earned in the United States.

One additional element of discontent seems to have been limited mainly to the peons on the huge Terrazas haciendas of Chihuahua. Here, in contrast to the great majority of all haciendas in the North, restrictions on the freedom of movement of many peons, such as debt peonage, had not disappeared. The old *caudillo's* unwillingness to break with traditional forms of servitude was combined with a unique capacity to avoid doing so. Because of his enormous economic and political power, Terrazas had the means, which few other northern hacendados

possessed, to enforce an increasingly unpopular system of debt peonage among his largely recalcitrant laborers.

In contrast to the "traditional" peons found mainly in Chihuahua, and to a lesser degree in Sonora, a new kind of "modern" estate laborer emerged, especially in the third state that was to provide an important segment of the northern revolutionary movement—Coahuila.

The term "modern peon" is perhaps the most appropriate one to designate the thousands of migrants from central Mexico, many of them expropriated peasants, who streamed into the newly developed regions of northern Mexico. The majority settled in a small area where perhaps the most rapid economic growth of the Porfirian period took place, the Laguna (area of Coahuila and Durango). In its cotton fields they earned the highest agricultural wages paid anywhere in Mexico. In addition, all forms of forced labor, such as debt servitude, had practically disappeared in that region. Even the *tienda de raya*, the ubiquitous company store, was different in the Laguna from that on most haciendas in Mexico. Workers were paid in cash rather than scrip and thus were not obliged to limit their purchases to the company store. The hacendados, who frequently charged lower prices in their shops than neighboring merchants, used the *tienda de raya* as a supplementary incentive to attract scarce laborers rather than as a means to increase their profits or to force workers to remain on their estates.

In spite of these advantages the region where these immigrants had settled, especially the Laguna, became an inexhaustible reservoir of revolutionary troops in the years 1910–20. The basic reason for this was not primarily opposition to the region's landowners. By comparing their situation with conditions in central and northern Mexico, from whence they had come, many migrants saw it in a favorable light. Only twenty years and one generation later would the Laguna's peasants (now born and bred in the North) turn against the region's estate owners.

In the 1910–20 revolution in fact many of the permanent resident peons on the haciendas revolted not against but together with their hacendados. Like medieval lords in Europe, some of the landowners of Sonora and the Laguna even led their well-paid and well-treated peons into battle.

By 1910 only one Mexican group finally benefited from the transformation of the frontier, the new caudillo class in Chihuahua and Sonora, which had begun to rise from the ashes of the old one in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The new class was an amalgam of "blue-blooded" and upstart caudillo dynasties. Some of the older ones who had been removed from power in the course of Díaz's transformation were able to make a comeback. Most prominent among them was the Terrazas clan, which made its peace with Díaz in 1903: Luis Terrazas was reappointed to the governorship of Chihuahua, to which he was succeeded by his son-in-law Enrique Creel and somewhat later by his son Alberto Terrazas. Other members of the new caudillo class were recruited by Díaz from the lower end of the old ruling stratum in the course of his political revamping of the region. Most prominent of these were Luis and Lorenzo Torres, military men who headed Díaz's faction in Sonora during Díaz's successful revolt of 1876; they ousted Ignacio Pesqueira, who had dominated the state for many years.

The *caudillos* of Coahuila were an exception to all this. Unlike Sonora and Chihuahua, Coahuila saw no lasting alliance formed between the new oligarchy and the Díaz government. In fact, by the time the new century dawned, the two were in open conflict.

In 1885, Porfirio Díaz had sent a close confidant, General Bernardo Reyes, to the northeastern states of Nuevo León and Coahuila as military commander with the directive to break the hold of the local *caudillos* so that their power could be assumed by the central government. Reyes was successful at first, but after he was appointed governor of Nuevo León in 1887 he allied himself closely with the old oligarchic circles and became one of the most powerful *caudillos* in Mexico. He was able to increase his already considerable support in the armed forces when he was given the post of minister of defense in 1900. He became the only new *caudillo* to call into question the power of Mexico's financial and political oligarchy, popularly called the *Científicos* because they espoused Auguste Comte's positivism and Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism. The ambitions of Reyes and the northeastern groups tied to him soon aroused the mistrust of Díaz, who sent Reyes back to Nuevo León in 1903 and put an end to his role as minister of defense.

The mounting enthusiasm that part of the northeast's upper classes (and to a lesser degree some Sonoran *hacendados*) manifested toward Reyes led to an increasing hostility toward them on the part of the Díaz administration. Unlike the elites of Chihuahua and Sonora, some of whose representatives Díaz had accepted into his administration, the wealthy and powerful merchants and landowners of the Laguna were excluded from representation in the federal government.

Díaz's opposition to this group of the northeastern elite as well as the latter's mounting bitterness may have been compounded by their increasing conflicts with foreign interests. The best-known, but by no means unique, conflict of this kind concerned the Laguna's (and probably all of Coahuila's) wealthiest family, the Maderos. (This family had never supported Reyes but one of its most prominent members, Francisco Madero, had for some years attempted to set up political opposition to the Díaz administration.) In contrast to the Torres and Terrazas families, the Madero clan, which was the wealthiest and most powerful family in Mexico's northeastern region, had never cooperated harmoniously with the U.S. companies and had become notorious among those companies for its ill-concealed confrontation tactics. At the turn of the twentieth century, Francisco Madero had formed and led a coalition of *hacendados* in the Laguna region to oppose attempts by the Anglo-American Tlahualilo Company to monopolize the water rights of that irrigation-dependent area. When the Maderos cultivated the rubber substitute *guayule*, they had clashed with the Continental Rubber Company. Another conflict developed because prior to 1910 the Maderos owned the only smelting oven in northern Mexico that was independent of the American Smelting and Refining Company.

The Maderos were not alone in their fight. Many other members of the northeastern upper class were interested in water rights in the Laguna, in the cultivation of *guayule*, and in the operation of independent smelting ovens in northern Mexico.

Most of the Laguna had been unpopulated wasteland before the hacendados reclaimed it. They did not have to confront a mass of peasants whom they had expropriated. The fact that the peons on their estates received the highest wages and enjoyed the greatest freedom found anywhere in the Mexican countryside had created a new kind of paternalistic relation between these landowners and their peons. The hacendados attempted to strengthen this relationship by providing schools and medical care to their workers. Some enlightened landowners, such as Francisco Madero, even extended many of these services to nonresident peons, thus earning their loyalty.

In the long run the hacendados' confidence in the passivity and loyalty of their peons proved to be completely unfounded. In the 1930s the second and third generation of Laguna peons set up the most militant peasant movement in Mexico. As a result the most radical agrarian reform that took place in Mexico in the thirties occurred in the Laguna. For the period 1910–20, however, with some significant exceptions, the hacendado's optimism was not unrealistic. Rather than rebel against the landowners, most of the peons of the Laguna preferred to join them in their fight against the federal government. Thus the northeast's hacendados, in addition to strong motivation to revolt, had a unique kind of mass support that allowed them to do so.

These uneven developments raise two obvious questions: Why did the North become the mainstay of the Mexican Revolution from which both its victorious leaders and armies emerged? And why, among the many frontier regions that developed on the American continent, was northern Mexico practically the only one where a large scale and successful revolutionary movement took place?

The answer to the first question is obviously linked to the rapid, largely foreign-induced, economic change in the North which led to large-scale economic and social dislocation. Northern Mexico, however, was not the only region so affected. Rapid growth linked to dislocations occurred elsewhere in Mexico, for example, in Morelos, Veracruz, and Yucatán. Radical social movements did emerge in all those regions, though not simultaneously; the Zapata revolt broke out in Morelos in 1910, but in Veracruz and Yucatán radical protest movements developed in the 1920s.

What distinguished the revolution in northern Mexico from these other movements was the diversity of social classes and strata that joined the revolution, on the one hand, and the access of the northern revolutionaries to arms, on the other.

What was unique to the North was that substantial portions from all classes of society participated in the revolution. It was the only part of Mexico, for example, with a relatively large stratum of revolutionary hacendados, whose support for anti-Díaz political movements threw them into alliance with middle classes and even the lower classes of society.

A dissatisfied middle class which resented the fact that it was excluded from political power, that it seemed to garner only the crumbs of Mexico's economic boom, and that foreigners were playing an increasingly important role in the country's economic and social structure existed in most parts of Mexico.

Nowhere, however, had it grown as rapidly as in the North, and nowhere had it suffered such losses in so short a span of time. Not only was the northern middle class profoundly affected by the cyclical crises of 1907 that hit the North far more than any other part of Mexico, but it also suffered greater political losses. In the nineteenth century because of the isolation of the frontier states it had enjoyed a degree of municipal and regional autonomy which was equaled in no other part of the country. The absorption of the North by the central government cost this class most of these traditional rights.

Nevertheless these losses were at first compensated for by two advantages the Diaz regime brought them: one was rapid economic growth and the building of railroads from which many of them benefited. The other was what could be called the introduction of the two-party system into some of the northern states. In Chihuahua for instance, after he became president, Diaz removed the traditional oligarchy from power and imposed his own men on the state. The Mexican president was not strong enough, however, to prevent the old ruling group from forming its own political party and challenging the new rulers of the state. In the resulting conflict both sides sought the support of the state's middle classes which thus gained a certain degree of political and economic leverage.

When Diaz, in a profound political reversal at the turn of the century, gave political control of their states to the oligarchy, he put an end to the two-party system and completely excluded large segments of the middle classes from political power. At the same time their economic situation grew drastically worse. They were first hit by inflation and rising taxes and many of them were ruined by the crisis of 1907-10.

The same crisis affected the North's industrial working classes to a degree unprecedented in their experience and unparalleled in the rest of Mexico. With the possible exception of the city of Mexico it was in the North of the country that the greatest number of unemployed workers could be found on the eve of the revolution.

Also the agricultural population of northern Mexico exhibited a number of traits that distinguished them from their counterparts in the rest of the country.

Because of the Apache wars, they had a far greater fighting tradition and more arms than peasants in any other part of the country. Because so many of them were engaged in industry and mining, many more peasants in the North had links to the nonagricultural population than in any other part of Mexico. The migrants and the *vaqueros* who formed a large part of the population of the northern countryside had no deep-rooted traditional attachment to a specific community.

These three factors were obviously conducive to their joining revolutionary armies.

To all of these characteristics that distinguished most social classes in the North from their counterparts in the rest of Mexico must be added a tradition of cooperation among all classes of society which first emerged in the Apache wars and which reemerged in the course of the revolution. While uprisings of peasants, industrial workers, and members of the middle classes occurred in

different parts of Mexico, only in the North were all of them able to unite among themselves and to join forces with a group of revolutionary hacendados.

The proximity to the United States was the last element that helped to transform the dissatisfaction of nearly all segments and classes of frontier society into revolutionary activity. The transformation of the frontier into the border did more than change many frontiersmen into revolutionaries. It also gave them the means for carrying out a revolution. Proximity to the United States provided them with an easy solution to the perennial problem facing all revolutionaries—access to arms. In spite of its neutrality laws, the United States was used as a sanctuary by revolutionaries preparing to launch a movement in Mexico. The ideological consequences of the economic symbiosis between Mexico's frontier and the American Southwest were as strange as the practical ones. A pronounced anti-American nationalism was combined with the desire of the Mexican middle and working classes to obtain the rights and freedoms enjoyed by their counterparts in the United States.

All these elements provide an explanation of why the Mexican North played a role so different from the rest of the country during the revolution. It also helps to explain why the Mexican North was the only frontier region in Latin America which became a center of large-scale revolutionary activity.

The Mexican Revolution and the Birth of the Mexican-American Civil Rights Movement

BENJAMIN JOHNSON

One of the most prolonged episodes of racial violence in United States history occurred at the southern tip of Texas from 1915 to 1919. It began in the summer of 1915 as a series of raids on ranches, irrigation works, and railroads by ethnic Mexicans and quickly developed into a full-blown rebellion. Groups of armed men—some from across the Rio Grande, others seemingly from out of nowhere—stole livestock, burned railroad bridges, tore up tracks, killed farmers, attacked post offices, robbed stores, and repeatedly battled local posses, Texas Rangers, and the thousands of federal soldiers dispatched to quell the violence. The groups ranged from two or three assailants who quickly vanished into the brush to scores of well-organized and disciplined mounted men.

The rebels, who came to be called "Sediciosos" or "Seditionists," killed dozens of Anglo farmers. Many Anglo residents fled the region. Hundreds, perhaps several thousand, clustered in urban areas.

The raids appeared to be the fulfillment of a manifesto entitled the "Plan de San Diego." This document came to light early in 1915 but remained largely ignored until the outbreak of violence. It called for a "liberating army for races

Benjamin H. Johnson, "The Plan De San Diego Uprising and the Making of Modern of Texas-Mexican Borderlands," in *Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History*, ed. Samuel Truett and Elliot Young, pp. 273-298 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Copyright, 2004, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

and peoples" composed of Mexicans, blacks, and Indians to kill all white males over the age of sixteen and overthrow United States rule in Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. The freed territory would form an independent nation, perhaps to rejoin Mexico at a future date. Modeled after other proclamations of the ongoing Mexican Revolution, the Plan seemed to promise—or threaten, depending on where one stood—that a revolution would erupt north of the Rio Grande.

The reprisals that followed the insurrectionary violence were even worse. Texas Rangers and local vigilantes led a brutal counterinsurgency that included indiscriminate harassment of ethnic Mexicans, forcible relocation of rural Tejanos, and mass executions. A San Antonio reporter observed that "finding of dead bodies of Mexicans, suspected for various reasons of being connected with the troubles, has reached a point where it creates little or no interest. It is only when a raid is reported or an American is killed that the ire of the people is aroused." On a single day in late 1915, for example, "near Edinburg ... the bodies of two more Mexicans were found. They had been slain during the night. During the morning the decapitated body of another Mexican roped to a large log floated down the Rio Grande." Respectable citizens openly made statements of near-genocidal racism: "The recent happenings in Brownsville country indicate that there is a serious surplus population there that needs eliminating," argued the editor of the *Laredo Times*.

At first glance these events seem sadly characteristic of the Southwest in the decades after its conquest by the United States. Ostensibly endowed with the full rights of citizenship by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, many ethnic Mexicans remained north of the border. Those who stayed, and their descendants, saw the victorious Anglos seize political and economic power. Even many formerly proud landowners ended up doing field work on land that had once belonged to them. In some places—most notably, South Texas and northern New Mexico, but for several decades also southern California—ethnic Mexicans remained a majority. In these enclaves, Anglos generally inserted themselves into the preexisting social hierarchy, often marrying into elite Mexican families and relying on their paternalist social relations to wield power without constantly resorting to force.

In South Texas, although a political "machine" run by Anglos and their elite ethnic Mexican compatriots ruled for nearly seventy years, popular resentment of marginalization and racism led to instances of open and even concerted rebellion. The region witnessed repeated clashes between defiant Tejanos and Rangers and other security forces. Two major uprisings, one led by Juan Cortina in 1859 and the other by Catarino Garza in 1891, were only defeated after intervention by the U.S. Army.

Such defiance was often articulated in the lingo of Mexican nationalism. Where their Anglo oppressors denigrated Mexican culture, rebels proclaimed their pride. Where Anglos celebrated the "manifest destiny" epitomized by their defeat of the Mexican nation, rebels often linked the protection of Mexicans in the United States to the redemption of the Mexican state.

A closer look at the tumult of the Plan de San Diego undermines this dualistic notion. The uprising not only became the occasion for massive and horrific racial violence but also precipitated protracted conflict among Tejanos. Its crushing defeat weakened the appeal of irredentist and Mexican nationalist politics, strengthening the position of those willing to use U.S. institutions and citizenship rights to advance the interests of ethnic Mexicans. Even as the Plan's failure solidified Anglo dominance and racial segregation in South Texas, it also helped push some Tejanos to embrace identities as Mexican Americans. Instead of continuing the contest of which nation would rule what territory, they aimed to change what United States rule would mean for those not of Anglo descent.

This essay examines the conflict between different Tejano factions during the Plan de San Diego uprising. In the decade before the uprising, ethnic Mexicans responded in divergent ways to an agricultural boom and consequent influx of Anglos. As their socioeconomic and political position became ever more tenuous, some continued to cooperate with the region's Anglo-dominated political machine. Others, inspired by the Mexican Revolution, advocated a violent redistribution of land. A third group, the "Tejano Progressives," embraced many of the region's economic changes even as it called for a revitalized Tejano community to combat discrimination and oppression. The revolt and backlash pit these groups against one another. The Texas-Mexico borderlands would continue to be influenced by the governments, capital, culture, and citizens of both Mexico and the United States. But the Plan de San Diego uprising transformed the pattern of future resistance to Anglo domination.

Cattle ranching, dominant since colonization by the Spanish empire in the mid-eighteenth century, lay at the heart of South Texas's social structure, politics, and identity. Though the U.S. conquest in 1848 did change the region, in many ways the Anglo newcomers assimilated themselves to Tejano social mores and institutions. Cattle ranching became more tightly linked to the U.S. market but remained the region's dominant economic institution. Anglos married into elite ranching families. Ethnic Mexicans were thus subordinated but not entirely dispossessed. They retained a measure of land, independence, and political power into the early twentieth century.

For the daily lives of Tejanos, 1904 was more of a turning point than 1848. On July 4, 1904, the first passenger train from the rest of the nation's railroad system arrived in Brownsville. The connection that it represented fatally undermined the social and political accommodation that Anglos and Tejanos had maintained for the previous six decades. By providing rapid and easy connection to major market centers, the railroad unleashed an agricultural boom. Real estate developers aggressively marketed the Lower Rio Grande Valley to farmers in Midwestern states, who soon flooded the area, founding dozens of new towns and nearly doubling the Valley's population in the years 1905-1910.

The agricultural boom subjected the ranching economy to a new set of pressures. Before the railroad, unimproved pastureland sold from fifty cents to two dollars per acre. By 1912, undeveloped land cost between one hundred and three hundred dollars an acre, and property that was easily irrigated or had particularly rich soil was sold for five hundred dollars or more per acre. These

rapid increases strained the operations of *rancheros* who were not interested in or sufficiently capitalized to do well in this new market. Inability to pay property taxes led to a dramatic increase in the number of sheriff's sales of tax-delinquent lands in Hidalgo County, sales that almost always transferred land from Tejanos to Anglos. The rise in land values also intensified conflict over land ownership. Land became too valuable to remain unoccupied or lightly used.

The combination of economic pressure, title challenges, and outright violent appropriation led to significant Tejano land loss shortly after the railroad's construction. From 1900 to 1910 Hispanic-surnamed individuals lost a total of more than 187,000 acres in Cameron and Hidalgo counties. In Hidalgo County during this decade, the percentage of rural land in Tejano hands declined from 28.6 percent to 16.8 percent. The corresponding drop in Cameron County was from 20 percent to 16.4 percent.

If the new agricultural economy strained the position of Tejanos, changing political dynamics in South Texas were even more hostile. Whereas Tejanos played an indispensable part in South Texas's political machine, the farmers' politics threatened to leave them with no political power at all. The newcomer farmers were fiercely antimachine, wanting little to do with what they perceived as a hopelessly corrupt political system that made the terrible mistake of enfranchising their racial inferiors. The solution to this problem, from their perspective, was simple: eliminate Tejano political power by disenfranchising those of Mexican descent. The tools for this strategy were readily at hand, for by 1910, Texas, like most of the South, had created the system of poll taxes, white primaries, and vigilante violence that all but stripped African Americans of the vote.

The new agricultural order affected Tejanos in different ways. Many became semimigrant laborers, working in towns like Brownsville or McAllen for part of the year, serving on land-grubbing crews, or picking crops from South Texas all the way to Oklahoma or Arkansas. A few prospered as merchants and land developers, carving out niches for themselves in sectors dominated by Anglo newcomers. And yet others continued as ranchers, whether as large market-driven businesses or small, subsistence-oriented family operations.

Tejano politics was similarly diverse. Some families continued to play an indispensable role in the machine as vote-deliverers and candidates for low to midlevel offices. In contrast, two more ideological factions of Tejano politics arose in the early twentieth century in response to the agricultural boom and influx of Anglos. Radicals, inspired by the Mexican Revolution, believed that violence was required to restore ethnic Mexican power in South Texas, a project which would in turn depend on the overall revitalization of Mexico vis-à-vis the United States. Others, whom I have termed "Tejano Progressives," saw hope in many of the political and ethnic developments of the Progressive Era United States. They encouraged ethnic Mexicans to combat their marginalization through economic success, education, and political power. They pointed to useful traditions and examples from both Mexico and the United States. These two currents fed both the Plan de San Diego and Mexican American politics.

Merchants and small businessmen of cities like Brownsville and Laredo, joined by elements of landed wealth, dominated Tejano progressivism. Progressives

adapted many of the tenets of Mexican liberalism to the circumstances of life in the United States. The ideal liberal society was one dominated by autonomous individuals equal before the law, unrestrained by such corporate entities as an established church or Indian communities. A central government with powers authorized by a written constitution and private property rights were the foundational institutions for such a society. Liberal elites and intellectuals were vehemently anticlerical and opposed to village commons and other collective lands. As the industrial revolution lifted western Europe and the United States to new heights of economic wealth and global power, Mexican liberals struggled to modernize their own country by preparing and even forcing its citizens to compete in a market economy. Steeped in this liberal tradition, the Progressives argued that Tejanos needed education and economic success to overcome the racism and political corruption confronting them. They aimed inward, seeking to remold Tejanos as a modern people, and outward, to secure their rights in an increasingly racist society.

South Texas's agricultural boom stimulated Progressives with the hope that economic development would both make Tejanos more industrious and give them a much-needed base of economic security. Laredo's Idar family, writers and publishers of the influential newspaper *La Crónica*, were so impressed with the Valley's transformation that they called for ethnic Mexican landholders farther upstream to construct their own rail system. The Idars' compatriot in Brownsville, lawyer and politician José Tomás Canales, described the arrival of the railroad as "the beginning of a new era in the Valley: the Era of Progress."

An awareness of Tejano land loss and the rise of segregationist politics tempered this enthusiasm. The ascendant farmers were not content with just economic dominance but also failed to respect the established social and political position of ethnic Mexicans in South Texas. "The rapid industrial and agricultural development of the lower Rio Grande daily brings to our land ... numerous elements unfamiliar with our prior rights as old inhabitants of the border," *La Crónica* noted in an article on Brownsville politics. Given "our lack of political foresight," the paper warned that "the newcomers," with their "new ideas, resources and lofty ambitions, will not hesitate to fleece us ... of the representation that we have collectively exercised for many years in banking, commerce, society, and politics."

The rising tide of racial segregation elsewhere in Texas particularly alarmed Progressives. Tejanos who witnessed Jim Crow in the rest of Texas or other parts of the South often feared that they saw their own future in whites-only train cars, restaurants, and waiting rooms. If this was what deepening the border's ties with the rest of the country meant, then they wanted none of it.

Fears like García's haunted Progressives, who watched as Jim Crow subsumed more and more areas where Mexicans previously enjoyed a measure of political power and social respectability: "In San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Seguin, Goliad and other currently important cities, founded by Mexicans," lamented the Idars, "there is no public place for Mexicans except for the inferior and poorly-paid jobs allowed them."

Avoiding this fate, according to the Progressives, required Texas Mexicans to increase their power through individual education, ethnic unity, and economic success. Although the Progressive position obviously demanded changes from Anglos—an end to lynchings, an undoing of segregation, respect for Mexican culture and traditions—it also insisted that Tejanos transform themselves, collectively and individually.

The Progressives held ambivalent and sometimes contradictory notions about their own national identity. They kept one foot planted in the soil of Mexican liberalism, frequently condemning Catholicism and other “superstitious” beliefs, while lauding such Mexican heroes as Benito Juárez. At the same time, they looked beyond Mexico to other ethnic and racial groups as examples of the successful implementation of their strategy. Clemente Idar called for “la Raza Mexicana” in Texas to follow the model of numerous ethnic groups within the United States. He hoped that Texas Mexicans would wield the same sort of political power that European ethnics exercised in the areas where they were numerically superior. Citing the Swedes in Minnesota as the preeminent example of such a group, Idar argued that “in this country, from its founding, even when all lived loyally under the national flag and as American citizens, its inhabitants have always divided themselves into peaceful factions along lines of racial origin.”

Despite an important sense of kinship, Tejanos were for the Progressives different from Mexico-born Mexicans. “They have their own ways of living in their own country,” Emeterio Flores said of Mexican nationals, “and it is absolutely different from ours. We people who were born in this country feel for them because they are our own race, although we were born and educated here in this country; we feel for those poor unfortunates, and we would not like to see them come here any more unless “conditions changed a great deal.”

Tejano Progressives harbored a similarly ambivalent attitude about the United States. Like the Latin American liberalism in which much of their own politics was steeped, they had deep admiration for some U.S. political traditions. In opposing the poll tax, for example, *La Crónica* referred to the “glorious and sublime principles of individual liberty and civil rights embodied by the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution of the American Republic.” The Idars encouraged Mexicans and Texas Mexicans to invoke such freedoms to protect themselves from discrimination and violence. They demanded protection for Texas Mexicans from lynchings and believed that such protection was more likely to come from federal power than from either Texas or the Mexican government. Given their harsh criticism of segregation and racial violence, their praise for the openness of U.S. life was high indeed.

The Idars even demonstrated at least a strategic interest in adopting some aspects of U.S. culture. They admired the business sense of Americans—even that of the farmers whose racism so offended them. As part of their education campaign, they wanted Texas Mexicans to learn “the language of the country in which they live.”

Despite the Progressives’ attachment to aspects of United States politics and culture, the currents of Mexican nationalism tugged at them. While some American

traditions were admirable, Tejanos risked losing their Mexicanness. Houston resident J. J. Mercado, for example, argued that Anglicisms corrupted the Spanish spoken by Texas Mexicans. For Mercado the use of terms like "bordeando" for the English "boarding" demonstrated that the isolated social life of Mexicans in Texas stunted their culture and even their mental faculties. Whatever their resentment of Mexican politics—or even of many of the Mexicans in Texas—and whatever the attraction of aspects of U.S. politics and culture, many Progressives hoped for the redemption of the Mexican national project.

The 1911 toppling of Porfirio Díaz and subsequent election of liberal Francisco Madero to the presidency of Mexico bolstered this hope. The Idars speculated that Mexicans might be able to leave the increasingly inhospitable Texas and return to "the sacred native ground of our ancestors." Indeed, the increasing likelihood of such a return was all the more reason "that before our relocation, we should study some lessons in democracy." Later that year, on Mexico's Independence Day, Tejano Progressives from Laredo and beyond hosted the "Primer Congreso Mexicanista," which drew delegates from dozens of Texas and Tamaulipas towns in an effort to defend the beleaguered rights of Mexicans in Texas. The largest ethnic Mexican civil rights meeting ever held up to that point, the conference hewed to the Progressive position on many ideological and pragmatic issues. At the same time, Mexican nationalism clearly dominated the attendees' political consciousness. Where the Idars and other Progressives were conflicted in their national consciousness, speaker after speaker at the conference emphasized that Texas Mexicans' future lay within the institutions and culture of Mexico.

If the advent of the Mexican Revolution seemed to turn Tejano Progressives away from their experimentation with U.S. citizenship rights, then in another sense it also energized Texas-Mexican politics. The plethora of Mexican politicians, military leaders, and intellectuals who found refuge in Texas brought with them a wide spectrum of political philosophies and visions of the future of Mexico.

Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón were some of the earliest and most influential exiles. First fleeing to Texas, then St. Louis, and ultimately to Los Angeles, they achieved remarkable success in spreading their newspaper, *Regeneración*, across the Mexican community in the United States and into Mexico itself. By 1906 nearly 20,000 people in both nations paid for subscriptions and avidly read the brothers' calls for formal political reforms such as a four-year presidential term with no reelection, classical liberal proposals such as taxing church property, and social reforms such as an eight-hour workday and an end to child labor. Their manifesto circulated across Mexico, gaining the support of many local liberal organizations, including groups involved in major industrial strikes, and helped to spark numerous small and unsuccessful uprisings in Mexico's North over the next several years.

Enrique and Ricardo, relocated in Los Angeles, became both more explicitly radical and less influential by the time that Francisco Madero became president in October 1911. Whereas liberals like Madero thought that private property allowed individuals to function as autonomous members of society, the Flores Magón brothers came to embrace the anarchist idea that property needed to be

redistributed so that the direct and decentralized control of the means of production could create an egalitarian and just society. They denounced Madero as a "traitor to the cause of liberty" and called for an armed struggle to redistribute land and wealth and destroy the power of the church, foreigners, and the rich. This stance cost them the support of Tejano Progressives, many of whom enthusiastically supported Madero.

In south Texas, Aniceto Pizaña, a rancher who lived near Brownsville, appears to have been the single most active Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) partisan. Pizaña not only faithfully contributed his own money to the legal defense of jailed PLM partisans; he also raised money and sold PLM literature in the Brownsville area. The *ranchero* was introduced to *Regeneración* by a friend in 1908 and soon distributed, as he put it, "the propaganda of Land and Liberty for all." Pizaña founded a South Texas PLM *grupo* named "Perpetual Solidarity." The anarchist condemnation of wage labor as a form of servitude would have had enormous resonance with *rancheros* like Pizaña, who found such labor (which was almost always in agriculture) exploitive and humiliating.

Soon enough Texas itself became the site of a rebellion. In 1915, *rancheros'* anger at their displacement boiled over into a sustained uprising. Aniceto Pizaña, attacked at his own ranch by Anglo vigilantes, joined the rebellion along with several of his PLM compatriots. Receiving some aid from a revolutionary commander based in Matamoros, the Sediciosos mounted an impressive series of raids in the fall of 1915. They attacked irrigation pump houses, derailed a passenger railroad car leaving Brownsville, terrorized and killed Anglo farmers against whom they bore grudges, and attacked a branch of the enormous King Ranch. Vigilantes, in response, began killing ethnic Mexicans—in some cases engaging in mass executions—and driving many *rancheros* off their lands. In the midst of this clearly racial violence, Tejanos were also set against one another. The three pre-uprising political factions—machine lieutenants, PLM-inspired radicals, and the Progressives—found themselves at odds and sometimes even at arms.

The first apparent killing of a Tejano by the rebels occurred on July 12, about a week after the first sustained flurry of raids on Anglo farmers. Ignacio and Adela Cantú shot and killed Brownsville deputy constable Pablo Falcón while he was on duty at a dance. The Cantús, according to witnesses, called out to Falcón and Cameron County deputy marshal Encarnación Cuellar and then shot both men from behind.

But Harbert Davenport, a Brownsville lawyer and sometimes legal partner of J.T. Canales, later described Falcón as "the raiders' first victim" and expressed his confidence that if he had the chance, Falcón "would have undoubtedly, warned me of the trouble brought about by the 'Plan of San Diego.'" Another Cameron County deputy sheriff, Carlos Esparza, who "allegedly had a reputation of mistreating local residents," was killed some two weeks before Falcón. Esparza's family had a long-standing dispute with the nearby Escamillas, some of whom soon joined the uprising. Two weeks after Falcón's shooting, one of the bands active in Cameron County killed a local Tejano, José María Benavides, during a raid on the Los Indios Ranch.

Low-level office holders such as Falcón were not the only Tejanos affiliated with the machine to be targeted by the Sediciosos. Pizaña and his comrades resented the complicity of many machine figures in the agricultural boom. The political establishment's willingness to resort to violence to crush the uprising only exacerbated this resentment. Indeed, the estate of a key Hidalgo County *jefe político* became the rebels' favorite target. The small town of Progreso, right along the river in the portion of eastern Hidalgo County known as Ojo de Agua, was a virtual private kingdom for Don Florencio Saenz. Saenz's prosperous store, his integrated farming and ranching operation (more than 40,000 acres, complete with its own private irrigation system), and the post office set up to cater to his community's needs reflected his success in navigating the currents of the Valley's new commercial order. Like most ranchers who benefited from the agricultural boom, Saenz relied on a nexus of economic and political power. He served as Hidalgo County commissioner from 1852 to 1905, delivering the numerous votes of his tenants, retainers, and kin to the Hidalgo County machine. According to one neighbor, "he practically controlled the votes of the eastern part of Hidalgo County for years and years."

Saenz's store had been robbed in May of 1914, more than a year before the wider-scale uprising began. Saenz named two local Tejano residents as participants in the robbery. They became some of the earliest lynching victims in 1915. The Sediciosos struck back hard, attacking Progreso four times in August and September of 1915. Soldiers and raiders exchanged gunfire on August 17 and 25, a four day-battle raged in the area from September 2 to 5, and another sustained and bloody fight took place on September 24.

If the rebels wanted to punish Saenz, they certainly succeeded. The September attacks forced him to shut down his store and transfer his goods to Mercedes. Although he hired a private security force to defend his vast estate, the frequent raids forced most of his tenants and nearby population out of the area for the better part of three years.

The reprisals and vigilantism launched by the newly unified Anglo newcomers exacerbated the divisions among Tejanos. Rancheros opposed to the uprising found themselves in a very difficult position, fearing both vigilante posses, often led by Texas Rangers, and attacks by the Sediciosos. As the raids and vigilantism continued into the fall of 1915, the Sediciosos seemed to prompt something of a backlash. Some Tejanos began cooperating with the army and local law enforcement officers to put an end to the raids. L. H. Bates wrote to the Texas adjutant general, the commander of the Texas Rangers, that "most all Mexican ranchmen in this section [near Brownsville] are ready to cooperate and do all they can to aid militia with aid of scouts and Mexican-Texas ranchmen who know the country."

Key Tejano Progressives joined the backlash. The Progressives found themselves in an awkward and in-between position. On the one hand, they wanted little to do with any violent upheaval or radical overthrow of established economic power. The Sediciosos' attacks on the railroad and the farmers affronted the Progressive support of economic development in general, and of South Texas' agricultural boom in

particular. On the other hand, the Progressives abhorred the growing vigilantism. The events of 1915 and 1916 must have confirmed their fear that a loss of Tejano economic power subjected them to marginalization and social violence. The machine's inability or unwillingness to limit such violence reflected the Progressive judgment that it held little promise for the betterment of Tejano lives.

Because no early raids occurred near Laredo, the Idars did not have to confront these tensions directly in the fall of 1915. J. T. Canales, on the other hand, was caught in the middle of them. His family's land (which included five different ranches at the time) and his own enthusiasm for agricultural development made Canales a staunch opponent of the uprising. He proved to be an active opponent as well. Although not part of a large meeting held in late October to coordinate a response to the raids, Canales chose his own method of action, organizing a regular patrol of like-minded Tejanos who assisted the army's efforts to turn back all raids at the river. Canales's efforts bore fruit. Soon, cavalry officers were reporting that the scouts he recruited had allowed them to detect and halt raids that otherwise would have slipped past their own patrols.

At the same time, Canales also made efforts to stop the vigilantism. Convinced that Aniceto Pizaña had been the victim of a neighbor who coveted his land, Canales did what he could to help the ranchero's family. When Aniceto's brother Ramón was charged with attempted murder for defending his ranch, Canales served as his legal counsel, ultimately winning his acquittal on the grounds of self-defense in an appeals court. On at least one occasion Canales secured the release of Tejanos detained for suspicion of involvement with the uprising. When the vigilantism grew more extreme in the fall of 1915, he spoke out publicly against the Texas Rangers' brutality. In 1919, again a member of the state legislature, Canales launched an investigation into the conduct of the Rangers that would document their worst crimes.

If Canales was in a difficult position, a split between the army and the Texas officials and citizens responsible for the vigilantism made it more tenable than it otherwise would have been. While local Anglos set aside their differences to face a shared threat, federal and state authorities found themselves increasingly at odds. Federal officers and the U.S. Army took a dim view of vigilantism. Because it generated support for the uprising among both the local Tejano population and some of the revolutionary forces across the river, such violence made the government's goal of restoring order more difficult. Consequently, army officers did not engage in arbitrary executions, killings, or removals. Some even made some efforts to prevent Rangers and civilians from doing so. Tejanos showed themselves to be very aware of the differences between state and local officers, sometimes asking for army units to be assigned for their protection. The deployment of federal soldiers could offer protection from Sedicioso reprisals and Ranger vigilantism alike.

The experiences of Laredo's Tejano Progressives indicate how the suppression of the South Texas uprising also silenced a wide range of political dissent. Although the Idars, living in Laredo, were removed from the majority of the raids and reprisals in 1915, the shock waves of the Plan de San Diego soon reached them. Like J.T. Canales, they showed little sympathy for the Plan or

its adherents. In the early stages of the Mexican Revolution, the Idars sided with Francisco Madero, even as the Flores Magón brothers denounced him as a sell-out, and would have had little sympathy for calls for a violent revolution on the north side of the Rio Grande. Clemente Idar actively opposed the Plan when the opportunity presented itself. After the June 1916 clashes in the Laredo area, local and federal authorities needed a reliable Spanish-speaking witness and translator to deal with the captured raiders. Court documents name a "C. N. Idar" as a witness to the statements of three men captured after the Webb Station raid on June 12. Idar copied and translated the letter from one of the prisoners to Mexican general Alvaro Obregón. Moreover, when it looked as though the Sediciosos would extend their campaign to the Laredo area in May and June of 1916, Clemente also served as an agent of the U.S. Department of Justice, passing along information about a raid nearby.

By 1919, when the end of World War I finally led to the withdrawal of the armed forces sent to quell the uprising, South Texas was in important respects a different place than it had been before. The defeat of the Plan de San Diego in 1916, high commodity prices, and vigorous marketing prompted a resumption of the region's agricultural boom. The balance of political and economic power shifted decisively to newcomer farmers. The machine and its Tejano lieutenants lost much of their power. Soon the Jim Crow-style segregation and disfranchisement that the Progressives had feared became a reality for all too many Tejanos. The land that produced Juan Cortina, Catarino Garza, and the Plan de San Diego would never again witness another sustained uprising. Seventy years after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the South Texas borderlands were politically and economically integrated into the United States, with dire results for ethnic Mexicans. Conquest, it seemed, was finally complete.

But it was not so simple, as subsequent events would demonstrate. Tejanos did not stop struggling for political rights and economic security in the modern borderlands. What distinguished their protests from those of their ancestors was their use of the language of U.S. nationalism to articulate their grievances. The 1920s saw the emergence of a Mexican American civil rights movement, with the embrace of American citizenship and the struggle for political and social freedoms under its rubric. Tejano Progressives, pitted against Mexican revolutionaries and Anglo segregationists during the uprising, shed their previous ambivalence about United States citizenship and played a key role in shaping the political platform and institutions of the first generation of Mexican Americans. At the founding convention of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the principal organization of this new political impulse, J. T. Canales and Clemente wrote much of the constitution and sponsored the controversial motion limiting membership to United States citizens.

Most of LULAC's platform and techniques had been anticipated by the Tejano Progressives in the decade before the Plan de San Diego. The Progressives were as intent on the modernization of their own people, the fitting of them with the skills and attitudes necessary to compete in twentieth-century United States, as they were on confronting Anglo racism. So was LULAC. Earlier in the century,

Canales, the Idars, and J. Luz Saenz pinned many of their highest hopes on the transformative potential of education, thereby singling out educational inequality and segregation as particularly offensive. So did LULAC. The Progressive current included politically engaged women and men who welcomed such activity. So did LULAC. The Progressives hoped that Mexican Americans would seek and gain political power on their own terms, rather than the machine's. So did LULAC. "One generation visualizes that which another brings into practice," wrote Clemente Idar shortly after the new organization's founding. "In the history of all peoples, that is exactly what human progress has brought about."

There was one critical difference, however, between LULAC and the Tejano Progressives. Where the Progressives had been able to pick and choose between U.S. and Mexican nationalism, LULACers were now enthusiastic American citizens. This was not because they had turned their backs on Mexican culture or customs, but rather because what they had endured during the Plan de San Diego convinced them of the dangers of statelessness: that they risked becoming a people belonging to no nation at all. Mexican Americans had fallen through the crack between the two nations. "We are becoming a new people on the margin of two great and powerful nations," editorialized *El Paladin* in its announcement of the founding of LULAC, "and continue being Americans to religiously fulfill all of our obligations, and Mexicans when it comes to sharing rights, especially in the South of Texas." "Mexican-Americans," emphasized Castulo Gutiérrez, "as long as we do not elevate ourselves to the level of citizens, will be nothing more than the conquered."

LULAC and its ideology of U.S. citizenship still competed with the machine and the nationalist politics of exile for Tejano loyalties. The remnants of South Texas's once mighty machine, which still ruled portions of the region's ranching areas, condemned the new organization. At times they even called in the Texas Rangers to harass and arrest LULAC organizers. Although vehemently opposed to the radicalism of the Flores Magón brothers and Aniceto Pizaña, the Mexican government created by the revolution called upon the loyalties of those of Mexican descent, insisting that their true home was south of the river. Angered by LULAC's American citizenship politics, Mexico's consul general in San Antonio warned those of Mexican descent "that they should always remember that they live in a foreign nation, that they came by their own choice to the United States and that they have no right to disturb the existing social conditions here." If "luck is bad in one place," he concluded, "they should seek their fortune in another or return to their country."

Such appeals fell on deaf ears. The Plan de San Diego uprising, intended to cast off United States rule, had instead helped to create the category of Mexican American. A critical mass of Tejanos had come to believe that the borderlands could be the site not merely of clashing sovereignties but also of multiracial democracy.

FURTHER READING

- Benton-Cohen, Katherine. *Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands* (2009).
- Gilly, Adolfo. *La revolución interrumpida; México, 1910–1920: una guerra campesina por la tierra y el poder* (1971; reprint, 1998).
- Hall, Linda B., and Don M. Coerver. *Revolution on the Border: The United States and Mexico, 1910–1920* (1988).
- Hart, John Mason. *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution* (1987).
- . *Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War* (2002).
- Horne, Gerald. *Black and Brown: African Americans and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920* (2005).
- Johnson, Benjamin Heber. *Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten Rebellion and Its Bloody Suppression Turned Mexicans Into Americans* (2003).
- Katz, Friedrich. *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (1981).
- . *Life and Times of Pancho Villa* (1998).
- Knight, Alan. *The Mexican Revolution*. 2 Vols (1986).
- Martinez, Oscar. *Fragments of the Mexican Revolution: Personal Accounts from the Border* (1983).
- Romo, David Dorado. *Ringside Seat to a Revolution: An Underground Cultural History of El Paso and Juárez, 1893–1923* (2005).
- Sánchez, George. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945* (1993).
- Sandos, James. *Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego, 1904–1923* (1992).
- Tinker-Salas, Miguel. *In the Shadow of the Eagles: Sonora and the Transformation of the Border During the Porfiriato* (1997).
- Vanderwood, Paul J. *The Power of God Against the Guns of Government: Religious Upheaval in Mexico at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century* (1998).
- Womack, John. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (1969).
- Zamora, Emilio. *World of the Mexican Worker in Texas* (1993).